WE WILL
LIVE TOGETHER IN THE UKRAINIAN STATE
Leonid Kravchuk, Member of Ukrainian Parliament First President of Ukraine
The first issue of a new magazine called "ÊÐÈÌÑÜʲ ÑÒÓIJ¯" has been published.
It is
designed to familiarize readers both in Ukraine and abroad with the lives,
problems, hopes and aspirations of the Crimean Tatars, a people with a hard and
tragic lot, who are attempting to rebuild their lives on ancestral lands in an
independent Ukraine…
In order to solve
the political – legal, social-economical, cultural issues connected with
adaptation and integration of the former deported Crimean Tatar People into
Ukrainian community, the uncertainty of a legal status of Mejlis, elected by
Kuryltay of Crimean Tatar People, under item 28 of article 106 of the
Constitution of Ukraine decrees to:…
Draft
of a
Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine ”On recommendations of parliamentary
hearings”, ”The issues of legislative regulation and realization of a public
policy on providing the rights of Crimean Tatar People and other national
minorities, which were deported, and for a voluntary return to Ukraine”
Draft
Decree of the Parliament
of Ukraine
Move by members of Parliament of Ukraine Udovenko G.Y. Chubarov R.A. Dzhemilev M.
On
recommendation of a parliamentary hearing on ”The legislative regulation and realization
of a public policy for the provision of rights for Crimean Tatar People and
National Minorities who were deported and have voluntary returned to Ukraine”
The
Parliament of Ukraine decrees to:
1.
Approve the recommendations of the parliamentary hearing ”The legislative
regulation and realization of a public policy for the provision of rights for
Crimean Tatar People and National Minorities who were deported and have
voluntary returned to Ukraine”
2. The
Council of Ministers jointly with the committees of the Ukrainian Parliament on
human rights, national minorities and interethnic relations, legal reforms,
public building, local government and committees, social policy and work,
international relations and relations with CIS, science and education, culture
and spirituality, takes the necessary measures for their realization.
3. Hear
the information on the realization of the recommendations on November 2000 (Day
of Government).
Analytical information on the issues
of return and resettlement of deported
peoples in Ukraine
Yuri Beluha, Deputy of Head of
State Committee on Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine
During the last 10 years, former deported peoples Crimean Tatars,
Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, and Germans, after half a century of exile, have
begun returning to their Homeland – Crimea. Currently, over 250 000 deported
Crimean Tatars, and about 12 000 persons of other nationalities have returned
to Crimea, consisting of about 12 per cent of the population of autonomy.
CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
Crimea
is a strategically important region of the south-eastern foreign policy
orientations of Ukraine and a key juncture of the pathways to the Mediterranean
and the Middle East. Losing control over Crimea would greatly jeopardize the
Ukrainian State’s national security and national interests. The Crimean problem
gains in importance far beyond the frames of the domestic situation in Ukraine.
As to the restoration of Crimea’s autonomy, Ukraine has given up its own
interests to a considerable extent, in favor of external forces, but at the
same time it continues to bear responsibility for the region’s stability and
security.
Oleksandr Piskun, Center for
Migration Studies, editor-in-chief, Problems of Migration magazine
…The process of the ex-deportees’ return and integration comprises
at least four major dimensions:
support for and facilitation of the ex-deportees’ return to their
ancestral homeland;
facilitating the returnees’ bid for solving their social and
economic problems;
evolving necessary legal
environments for the returnees’ rehabilitation (restitution of their civil
rights), both on the individual and ethnic entity levels;
defining the legal status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine…
INTERETHNIC RELATIONS AND THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN CRIMEA
Natalya Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute For Democracy
Ukraine is known to be home to some 130 nationalities in addition
to the title people. This fact cannot but cause certain problems and tensions
in interethnic relationships, particularly under the transition period from
totalitarianism to democracy and the conditions of a systemic social-economic
crisis, when fight is acerbated among various clans for control over the
national budget’s scarce resources and distribution levers toward benefiting
particular ethnic groups, clans, political groupings, and so on.
Leonid Kravchuk
Member of Ukrainian
Parliament
First President of
Ukraine
WE WILL LIVE TOGETHER IN
THE UKRAINIAN STATE
The
first issue of a new magazine called "ÊÐÈÌÑÜʲ
ÑÒÓIJ¯"
has been published.
It is designed to
familiarize readers both in Ukraine and abroad with the lives, problems, hopes
and aspirations of the Crimean Tatars, a people with a hard and tragic lot, who
are attempting to rebuild their lives on ancestral lands in an independent
Ukraine.
Only a person who has
himself experienced the violence, abuse, and indignity of the Crimean Tatars
can understand their feelings in full measure.
The
historical destinies of the Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar peoples have a lot
in common. For many centuries, both peoples were suffering under the Russian
Crown. In the 1930s and 40s, during the period of Soviet power, both suffered
the loss of their intellectuals and the destruction of their national shrines
in the Soviet fight against so-called "nationalism".
Ukrainians
and Crimean Tatars should remember their joint history, both the good and the
bad.
For many centuries the
Crimean Tatars had close contacts with Ukrainians. However, Soviet histories
kept this shared history secret and presented a false picture of those
contacts. All bright aspects of the relationship were thoroughly suppressed,
highlighting the worst: raids, devastation, pillaging, and slavery.
However,
the historical fact remains that during the struggle for the liberation of the
Ukrainian people, headed by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Crimean Tatars fought jointly
with Cossacks in many battles against Polish troops. Bohdan Khmelnytsky spent
his younger years in Crimea, spoke the Crimean Tatar language fluently, and was
considered a blood brother of a Crimean Khan's son. The correspondence of
Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Crimean Khan, written in the Crimean Tatar
language, are still kept in the London Library. Perhaps these historical
documents will return to Ukraine some day, and become a shared legacy of our
peoples.
There is
no guilt on the part of the new Ukrainian nation or the Ukrainian people in the
Crimean Tatar's tragedy. The Communist rulers of former USSR are responsible
for these atrocities. In May 1944, the lie of Lenin’s so-called national policy
became apparent when the total deportation of Crimean Tatars from their
historical homeland was carried out in three days to live in exile
"forever and with no right to return to the former residence" as
described in CPSU documents.
To justify
this outrageous crime, the entire Crimean Tatar people were branded as
"traitors and the collaborators with the Nazi invaders". The Tatars,
whose daughters and sons bravely fought against the Nazis, were insulted and
humbled. Many who were deported had been awarded the title "Hero of
USSR".
It would
be good if today's Communists, as inheritors of the history of the CPSU, would
have the bravery to take responsibility for the Communist insults and
violations of the rights of the Crimean Tatars, or even better, to apologize
for this injustice.
Over the
deportation years, every trace of the Crimean Tatar people was destroyed in
Crimea; cemeteries, mosques, religious schools, etc. Many towns and villages were renamed.
Only with
Ukrainian independence was started a new page in the history of the Crimean
Tatars. Ukraine has, and continues to strive to do everything possible to
somehow compensate the Crimean Tatars for the moral anguish caused by the
actions of the Communist regime. The Crimean Tatars have returned to their
ancestral land to stay forever. They live and work in the Ukrainian State as
citizens, enjoying full rights. It is possible to state unequivocally that the
Crimean Tatars have been reinstituted within the Ukrainian State.
In the
beginning of our independence we believed that we could promptly overcome all
difficulties. In that period, we were
enthusiastic and a little bit naive. We
wanted to do everything to speed up the process of the Crimean Tatars’ return
and resettlement in their homeland. However, reality proved to be greatly more
complicated. The issues we face in the areas of socio-economic and
cultural-educational areas are complicated. Much work must still be done to
provide people with opportunities in the way of jobs, wages, and pensions.
Ukraine is in a very complicated economic condition; in connection with this,
the solution of many of the issues faced by the Crimean Tatars depends on the
resources available to the State.
However,
there are a number of important issues facing the Crimean Tatars whose
resolution doesn't require financing, only good will and understanding. In
particular, an important step has been made toward the restitution of the
Crimean Tatars' Ukrainian citizenship. As a result of negotiations between the
Presidents of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, a protocol agreement on simplifying the
procedure for Crimean Tatars' to give up their Uzbek citizenship was signed.
I think
that the issue of proportional representation of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean
Parliament will be solved. It is necessary to study these issues, taking into
account relevant international experience. Everything must be done on a legal,
constitutional basis, without infringing on the rights of any National
Minorities.
There is
very complicated ethnic situation in Crimea, in which live a lot of
nationalities. Currently, Crimean Tatars constitute about 11 percent of the
population of Crimea. Recognizing the necessity for historical justice, a
solution must be found which does not create new injustices new opposition
forces.
If radical
solutions to this complicated issue were pursued, it would be hard to predict
the future situation in the peninsula, and its impact on Crimean Tatars.
All of us
- Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars and other nationalities living in
Crimea, must take into account the conflicts in Caucasus, Balkans and other regions
in the world, and demonstrate wisdom in recognizing the fact that inter-ethnic
problems require a patient and well thought out solution.
We should
keep in mind the significance of the Ukrainian language for Crimean Tatars as
well. In Ukraine, Crimean Tatars who do
not know the Ukrainian language cannot see themselves as citizens enjoying full
rights in future. In Crimea, the situation regarding the teaching of the
Ukrainian language is well known. In this case, the Ukrainian Government must
pursue a clear and well-articulated policy. The Constitution of Ukraine must be
observed, which says that the official language of Ukraine is Ukrainian and its
teaching must be dynamically implemented.
I am
convinced that Crimean Tatars rely on Ukraine to give them hope for the
solution of their issues. At one recent meeting was said: "We believe
Ukraine fought for many centuries for freedom and independence, and at last,
has achieved this goal. We are sure that such a freedom-loving nation, which
has sacrificed millions of its sons and daughters for freedom, will not prevent
the national self-determination of other peoples".
Crimean
Tatars are a people indigenous to Ukraine, and occupy a rightful place both in
Crimea and in Ukraine as a whole.
I, as the
first President of Ukraine and a person participating in the adoption of
important decisions on the return of Crimean Tatars to their historical
Homeland as well as the establishment of Crimean autonomy, and relations of
independent Ukraine with Russia and other members of the CIS, must note, that
in that difficult time we acted wisely and without straying from a carefully
planned course.
Upholding
the principles of liberty, independence, and democracy with an eye towards
Europe, I would like to appeal to the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars that it is
necessary to examine the current state of affairs on the peninsula, and to look
for the ways and means to improvement the situation.
Though the Constitutions
of Ukraine and Crimea are not perfect, we cannot attempt to live under other
laws. It is necessary to improve these foundations, rather than disregard them.
We must rectify the admitted mistakes jointly, along with the entire world.
These
desires cannot be satisfied, however, without the appropriate preconditions.
The most important thing at this stage is to prevent unnecessary clashes and
social discord. We have started creating Ukraine's statehood in a prudent and
tolerant way, and must keep to this path in the future.
In order to solve the political – legal, social-economical, cultural issues connected with adaptation and integration of the former deported Crimean Tatar People into Ukrainian community, the uncertainty of a legal status of Mejlis, elected by Kuryltay of Crimean Tatar People, under item 28 of article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine decrees to:
1 Establish the Council of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar People as consultative body attached to President of Ukraine
2 Appoint Dzhemilev Mustafa as Head of the Council of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar People. Confirm a personnel of the Council of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar People (attached)
3 The Head of the Council M. Dzhemilev to give a draft of status of the Council of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar People for month.
Kiev
18 May 1999
¹518/99
Approved
by
Decree of President of Ukraine
from 18 May 1999
¹518/99
Bekirov Nadir secretary of the Council
Abdulayev Kurtseit
Ablayev Remzi
Ablyamitov Dzhulvern
Adelseitv Refat
Alibeyev Enver
Alchikov Arsen
Asanov Kurtegen
Asanov Shevket
Belyalov Musa
Dzhepparov Abdureshit
Izetdinov Server
Kadirov Sinaver
Kaybulayev Shevket
Karayev Emirasan
Kenzhaliyev Refat
Kurtbedinov Zevri
Kurtumerov Dzhevdet
Mambetov Dilyaver
Mamutov Bekir
Mustafayev Halil
Ozenbashli Meryem
Seitbekirov Eldar
Seitvapov Ebazer
Suleymanov
Abmedzhit
Umerov Ilmi
Fazilov Nadir
Hamzin Ali
Chobanov Mamedi
The Head of Administration of
President of Ukraine M.
Biloblodskii
Draft
of a Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine ”On recommendations of parliamentary
hearings”, ”The issues of legislative regulation and realization of a public
policy on providing the rights of Crimean Tatar People and other national
minorities, which were deported, and for a voluntary return to Ukraine”
For period of time under Stalinist repression, the
forced mass deportation of peoples according to national sign from Ukraine in
its present boundaries was made.
On May 1944, the Crimean Tatar People suffered a total
deportation to back lands of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikistan
and Russian Federation. According to formal information of that time,
approximately 200 000 Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported. In the summer of
1944, similar actions were committed against 38 000 Armenians, Bulgarians and
Greeks, who were residents of Crimea. Already, in 1994, about 450 000 Germans
from Ukraine, including 51 000 from Crimea were deported. In addition,
thousands of Hungarians, Poles, Romanians and other nationalities were forcibly
deported from Ukraine.
All population deportations were carried out in
accordance with decisions made by the bodies of the government of the former
USSR. The ill – founded charges and the principle of collective responsibility
were used as justifications for these decisions. A transfer of these
populations – in an oppressive manner –
took place; thousands people died, and those who survived were forced to
live, for long periods of time, in special settlements, where there was no rule
of law, and decisions were made by military
commandant’s offices.
In 1956, the repression and
deportation – by governmental bodies of the USSR - of Balkarian, Ingushian,
Kalmyk, Karachai and Chechen peoples from the Russian Federation was recognized
as illegal, and they were permitted to return to their homeland. At the same
time, a Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR «On
a removal of the restrictions on special settlements of Crimean Tatars,
Bulgarians, Turks – citizens of USSR, Kurds, Hemshils and their families,
deported during Great Patriotic War» prohibited to Crimean Tatars coming back
to Crimea.
Until the end of 1989, a return of Crimean Tatars was
practically impossible. Thousands of families, which returned to Crimea between
1960 – 1980s, suffered repeated exile. Hundreds of persons were convicted for
”violations” of the registration regime.
A process of rehabilitation of deported peoples by
national sign, including Crimean Tatar People, began with the adoption, on 14
November 1989, of the Declaration ”On the recognition as illegal and criminally
repressive measures against peoples who suffered a forcible transfer, and on
the provision of their rights” by the Supreme Council of USSR.
Up until now, in Ukraine the legal rehabilitation of
the victims of racial discrimination in Ukraine was not made, and the issues of
the return, resettlement and restoration of the rights of deportees were not
legally regulated. Achieving a solution
has thus been rendered difficult, and the reintegration of these peoples into
the Ukraine made difficult. These circumstances, and the clearly insufficient
financing of the process of resettlement of former deported peoples who have
returned to Ukraine, are the source of socio–economical and political tension
in various regions of Ukraine, particularly in Crimea.
Taking the extraordinary urgency of these issues into
account, including the complexity of a definition of similar approaches for
realization of the issues connected with mass violations of human rights and
rights of peoples in the USSR, we propose to hold a parliamentary hearing on
”The problems of legislative regulation and the realization of a public policy
providing for the rights of Crimean Tatar People and National Minorities who
were deported and voluntary returned to Ukraine”.
The goal of such a parliamentary hearing would be: to
attract attention to the necessity of a legislative solution to issues of the
return, resettlement and restoration of the rights of deported Crimean Tatar
People and National Minorities returning to Ukraine; define the basic
approaches of appropriate bills; fix a date of consideration and adoption by
Parliament of Ukraine; and make recommendations to bodies of the government.
We propose the consideration of a proposed draft of
recommendations for a parliamentary hearing and their approval by Decree of the
Parliament of Ukraine.
Move by members of Parliament of Ukraine Udovenko G.Y.
Chubarov R.A.Dzhemilev M.
Decree of the
Parliament of Ukraine
On recommendation of a parliamentary hearing on ”The
legislative regulation and realization of a public policy for the provision of
rights for Crimean Tatar People and National Minorities who were deported and
have voluntary returned to Ukraine”
The Parliament of Ukraine decrees
to:
1. Approve the
recommendations of the parliamentary hearing ”The legislative regulation and
realization of a public policy for the provision of rights for Crimean Tatar
People and National Minorities who were deported and have voluntary returned to
Ukraine”
2. The Council of Ministers
jointly with the committees of the Ukrainian Parliament on human rights,
national minorities and interethnic relations, legal reforms, public building,
local government and committees, social policy and work, international
relations and relations with CIS, science and education, culture and
spirituality, takes the necessary measures for their realization.
3. Hear the information on the
realization of the recommendations on November 2000 (Day of Government).
The Chairman of
Parliament of Ukraine
Draft
Recommendations
of the participants of parliamentary
hearing
”The legislative regulation and
realization of a public policy
for the provision of rights for Crimean
Tatar People and
National Minorities who were
deported and have
voluntary returned to Ukraine”
The participants of
the parliamentary hearing, who analysed a process for the return, resettlement
and restoration of the rights of Crimean Tatar People and other national
minorities, which were deported and have voluntary returned to Ukraine, noted
that Ukraine unconditionally condemns the crimes against peoples and national
minorities, which suffered a forcible deportation, and support their voluntary return
to places of historical living.
At the same time,
parliament-hearing participants expressed a keen dissatisfaction with the legal
regulation of that process, which, in its turn, reduced the practical measures
realized by bodies of executive power for the solution of issues connected with
the return and resettlement of deported peoples in Ukraine.
In the social –
political structures of the community, a profound understanding of that issue
has not yet been reached for the importance of a solution for the further
strengthening of interethnic harmony in Ukraine, for overcoming the tragic
legacy of totalitarian policy, for the solidarity of different nationalities,
and for restoration and development of a civil society in Ukraine. The lack of
a precise complex public policy for the restoration of the rights of former
deported Crimean Tatar people and national minorities, an ignorance of legal
interests and rights of former deportees, including the adoption of new laws
and other normative acts, lead to the discrediting of bodies of government and
increase the social – economical and political tension in separate regions and
in the country as a whole.
Parliamentary hearing
witnesses noted that the Crimean Tatar issue is one of the most acute problems
and requires an immediate solution. It is connected with 280 000 deportees
returned to Ukraine, 270 000 of which are Crimean Tatars. In effect, in 1944,
Crimean Tatars as a whole ethnos were deported.
During some years in
minds of former USSR, Crimean Tatars actively struggled for a restoration of
their rights as a complex of Indigenous People rights, forcibly deported from
historical Homeland. It is obvious that Crimean Tatars don’t consider
themselves as national minority in Ukraine, as acting legislative considers, if
all non – Ukrainians are considered as national minorities. In this connection,
it is necessary to understand that the historical homeland of Crimean Tatars
where they as ethnos were formed, is under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, which
first of all, is obliged to draw up a set of political-legal measures
guaranteeing the preservation and development of Crimean Tatar ethnos in
Ukraine and the equal participation in the political, economical and cultural
life of state.
Parliamentary hearings
once again demonstrated the fact that succeeding the issue of former deported
Crimean Tatar People and national minorities, as a legacy of the former USSR.
Currently, Ukraine is responsible for achieving a solution. In the period 1990
– 1998, a sum of assigned capital funds from state budget, for the financing of
appropriate measures connected with the return and resettlement of deported
peoples, constituted 415 mln., grivnas. This sum, however, is not sufficient
for a solution of majority of the issues in this area. The repeated appeals of
the bodies of government of Ukraine to other states – participants of CIS –
concerning a financing of a resettlement of former deported peoples remained
without an appropriate answer.
Inflationary and other
processes in countries complicate the grave condition of former deported
peoples, who have returned to Ukraine, as repatriates lose their personal
savings in the return to Ukraine, they are unable to sell their own houses, and
are forced to bear transport and other charges.
In
order to realize the immediate measures and cardinal reformation of a public
policy on providing for the rights of Crimean Tatar People and national
minorities who were deported and have voluntary returned to Ukraine,
participants of parliamentary hearing advise:
The Parliament of
Ukraine to:
1.
Take measures for the elaboration and adoption of laws connected with
determination of status and rights of indigenous peoples in Ukraine, and for
the rehabilitation and restoration of the rights of deported Crimean Tatar
People and national minorities.
2.
Enforce a legal solution of the set of issues connected with the return,
resettlement and integration of deported Crimean Tatar People and National
Minorities.
3.
The Committee on the human rights, national minorities and interethnic
relations to:
a) Speed up the consideration of a bill of
Ukraine ”On Status of Crimean Tatar People of Ukraine”
b) To subjects of law of legislative
initiative jointly with Committee on legal reform and state construction, local
government and councils prepare and move the bills oriented to establishment of
legal conditions for providing of a guaranteed representation of Crimean Tatars
in Supreme Council of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and local government.
1. Take into account
the ethno-political situation in Ukraine, President Ukraine as Head – of –
Government, guarantee the observance of the Constitution of Ukraine, human
rights and freedoms and citizens as well – work out and realize a set of
measures for further harmony of interethnic relations, achievement of
interethnic peace, including an understanding of the aspirations of Crimean
Tatar People, national minorities who suffered forcible deportation, to return
to historical places of living and a restoration of the rights violated by
deportation.
2. Decree to finish a
working and moving a bill of Ukraine ”On the Adoption of a public policy by
Ukraine on Indigenous Peoples and National Minorities ”for consideration by
Parliament of Ukraine.
3. Decree to study the
issues and ratification of Convention of International Labour Organization #
169 ”On Indigenous Peoples in independent states”
The Council of
Ministers of Ukraine to:
1. Provide a
purposeful financing of State budget for measures regarding the return and
resettlement of deported Crimean Tatar People and National Minorities, through
a working of the bills of State budget and forming a normative budget
relationship between the State budget and the budget of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea. A financing from the budget of Crimea and local, add to state
financing.
2. Initiate, within
frames of the CIS, a holding of bilateral negotiations on the development of a
co-operation of States, on issues regarding the return and resettlement of
deported peoples and national minorities.
3. Take measures for
the further assistance in the resettlement of deported peoples from other
States, international organizations and foundations. Consider an opportunity to
use the investment forms of assistance.
4. Consider a
realization of Decree of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine #636 from 11
August 1995, ”On measures relating to solution of the political – legal, social
– economical and ethnical issues of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and #
1191 from 27 October 1999 ”On realization of the orders of President of Ukraine
and acts of Council of Ministers of Ukraine on solution of the issues of
resettlement of deported Crimean Tatars and other nationalities”. Establish a
normative basis for the resolution of issues connected with the return and
resettlement of deportees, and the satisfaction of their social-economical and
cultural – educational needs.
5. Include a nationality
”Crimean Tatar” in the list of nationalities used in the census.
6. Work out and
realize, in collaboration with the Fund of State property of Ukraine, measures
on the participation of repatriates in further privatisation.
7. Reconsider, jointly
with Council of Ministers of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a situation of
investment distribution for the resettlement of repatriates of different
nationalities, in order to redirect them towards those persons who returned to
Ukraine.
Yuri Beluha, Deputy of Head of State Committee
on Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine
Analytical information on the issues of return and
resettlement of
deported peoples in Ukraine
During
the last 10 years, former deported peoples Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians,
Armenians, Greeks, and Germans, after half a century of exile, have begun
returning to their Homeland – Crimea. Currently, over 250 000 deported Crimean
Tatars, and about 12 000 persons of other nationalities have returned to
Crimea, consisting of about 12 per cent of the population of autonomy.
Information
On May 1944, about
200 000 Crimean Tatars were illegally deported from Crimea. In the following
month, Crimean Bulgarians, Armenians, and Greeks suffered the same fate – a
total 38 000 persons. Before, in 1941, over 50 000 Germans, who had lived in
Crimea for 150 years, were deported.
The forcible
transfer of peoples by national belonging, were carried out in a brutal
manners; in no other State did analogous events occur. This exile of entire
ethnic groups lasted for many decades. In fact, the last restrictions for their
return were not removed until the late 1980s.
The total number of
deported peoples, including other nationalities, is greater than in official
figures. At the same time, during the totalitarian regime, many Poles from
western regions of Ukraine were deported. In addition, in pre-war and war
years, 600 000 Ukrainians from Western Ukraine were forcibly deported.
The ethnic
existence of Crimean Tatars, who were subjected to a total deportation, was
threatened.
On 14 November
1989, the Supreme Council of former USSR adopted a Declaration ”On the
recognition as illegal and criminal, actions against peoples who suffered the
forcible deportation, and providing their rights”. As a result of this
Declaration, a number of normative acts regulating the processes connected with
the return of deported peoples were adopted, and state financing was planned.
In addition, in 1990 – 1991s, the state bodies of Ukraine and USSR adopted the
primary measures connected with return of Crimean Tatars. Only in 1991, 210
mln., rubles on realization of them was planned, Ukraine only 10 mln., rubles
out sum total. However Ukraine invested 70 mln., rubles already.
Since the collapse
of the USSR, Ukraine alone bears the brunt of all expenses connected with the
return and resettlement of deported peoples. Other States of CIS, the
successors of USSR, are not taking any action.
Towards the end of
1991, the Ukrainian government adopted the normative acts regulating the return
of Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians, and Germans as well, deported from
Ukraine.
In 1992, Ukraine assigned over 10
billion karbovans out of state budget of Ukraine for deported peoples, in 1993
– 110 billion karbovans, in 1994 – over 1 trillion karbovans, in 1995 – 2
trillion 478 billion karbovans.
Beginning in 1996,
a tendency towards limiting of a budget allocation was emphasized, which as
rule, allotting was not carried out in full measure. Thus, in 1996 out of a
planned 28 mln., grivnas for investments, state budget allotted only 6,2 mln.,
grivnas, from 6 mln., grivnas (budget of Crimea) for social – cultural measures
and assistance, only 3,3 mln., grivnas were financed.
In 1997, a situation of the
financing was improved. Out of a planned 13, 3 billions grivnas, only 12, 85
billions grivnas were financed, constituted almost 97 per sent.
At the same time, according to the
Program of the immediate steps for the settling and resettlement of deported
Crimean Tatars and other nationalities, the total cost of works for the
providing of needs of deported peoples constituted approximately 3,5 billions
grivnas, and debt to contractors for executed phase – about 21,5 mln., grivnas.
In 1998, it was
planned to allot 12 mln., grivnas for measures connected with resettlement of
deported peoples, Autonomous Republic of Crimea (with Sevastopol). Factually
assigned only 2,7 mln., grivnas, which constituted about 22 per cent of the
original plan.
As is well known, the
return and resettlement coincided with acute aggravation of economical
relations in Ukraine. Despite the economical situation, the Government of
Ukraine is now looking for the funds to support a resettlement of deported
peoples. The realization of a set of measures connected with the solution of
the marked issues concerning social-economical, political-legal and
humanitarian areas.
During 1992-1998s, assigned
means corresponding to 300 mln., dollars for a capital construction, gave the
opportunity to build 273 000 square meters of accommodation, 375 kilometers of
water – supply, 851,4 kilometers of electric power lines, 84,3 kilometers of
roads.
In 1999, it was planned to assign 20
mln., grivnas from the State budget for the resettlement of deported peoples,
out of them 11 mln., grivnas – for capital construction, including 10 mln.,
grivnas of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and 9 mln., grivnas for keeping of
additional set of social-cultural establishments and compensatory payments to
deported peoples. Currently 11 633 grivnas out of the State budget were
financed, which is much more than last year.
In 1999, a number of
important public decisions relating to a solution of the social – economical
needs of deportees were adopted. Besides,
by
decisions of Council of Ministers from 15 March 1999 # 1447, the procedure of
providing the deported peoples and their families, who returned to Ukraine by
building or purchasing accommodation at the expense of special public
investments was approved, and the procedure of giving of long – term, interest
- free credit for individual houses or buildings to deported peoples returned
for domicile.
For the realization of the decision of the Council of
Ministers of Crimea from 24 May 1999 #182 ”On measures relating to the solution
of the issues of Crimean Tatar People”, in republican budget 2000, funds for
the allotment of preferential credits for individual builders were allocated:
10 mln., grivnas for resettlement of deportees, and 1,5 mln., grivnas by
separate line.
The established land reserves bank
and emergency fund necessary for repatriates were not participating in land
sharing.
The Council of
Ministers of Crimea forms a reserve of a professional community for the
replacement of vacant posts in bodies of executive power, paying special
attention to the inclusion of Crimean Tatars specialists in the professional
community.
On 27 November
1999, the Council of Ministers considered the course of a realization of
commissions of the President of Ukraine, acts of Government of Ukraine relating
to a solution of the issues of Crimean Tatar People and adopted the appropriate
resolution # 1991.
The draft state
budget of Ukraine on 2000, moved by a Council of Ministers of Ukraine for
Verkhovna Rada, plans to allot for realization of the measures connected with
return of Crimean Tatar People and other nationalities, at the rate 40 mln.
grivnas, including 31 mln. grivnas for investment and 9 mln. grivnas for
development of social-cultural area.
It should however be
noted that, a number of social-economical factors remain, which require urgent
solution:
- Unemployment – 46,9 % Crimean
Tatars have an unemployment level three times as high as the general level of
unemployment in Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The largest critical situation
arises in Bakchisaray – 51% are the unemployed, Sakskii (60,3%) and Leninsky
(56,6%) regions, Yalta – 59,4%, Feodosiya – 53,6%, Sudak – 58,8%.
- bad conditions of infrastructure
in places of compact living – 48,8% Crimean Tatars have no private habitation,
providing the localities with living of Crimean Tatars by electric power
constitutes 75%, water-supply – 27%, level of gas doesn’t exceed 3%, sewer and heat
systems are practically lacking, providing of roads and solid covering is about
10%;
- Problems of medical provision.
Analysis of serious illnesses has demonstrated that Crimean Tatars are the
basic ”group of risk” for most illnesses: sickness rate of nervous system
bone-muscular system is three times the mid-index in the autonomous region,
oncological illnesses are 1,5 times as high as the average.
Taking into account a
present economical situation in country, the government of Ukraine defined the
priority directions of resettlement of repatriates, namely:
1) the appropriate financing of
measures connected with the return and resettlement of deportees; 2) finishing
of the started construction of housing, social-cultural projects and
appropriate engineering structures;, a higher degree of commission time (50%
and more); 3) housing provided for the deportees, including its ransom and
preferential credit for individual house-building; 4) participation of
deportees in the privatization of the private enterprises; 5) the provision of
land for deportees; 6) provision of employment for repatriates.
On level with adoption
of the priorities, Government of Ukraine realized a significant work connected
with a search of funds from alternative sources, including from donor states,
international organizations and foundations that in conditions of the reduction
of a financing out of the State budget take on particular actuality.
Sum total of international
assistance to deportees returned and living in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, for the last 3 years, constitutes over 10 mln., dollars (U.S.)
First of all, assistance of UNHCR (over 4 mln.,
dollars U.S.), UNPI (over 4 mln., dollars U.S.), Turkish Agency of
International Development (TIKA) (about 1 mln., dollars U.S.), International
Foundation ”Renaissance” (about 1,2 mln., dollars U.S.) and so on.
However this is not enough and it is
thus necessary to find new donor states and international organizations and to set
the appropriate contacts on bilateral base. Currently, about 50 drafts of a
total sum about 10 mln. grivnas on attraction of the funds from international
organizations and donors – states for defined goals under the orders of a
Council of Ministers of Ukraine # 1991 from 27 October 1999, were prepared by
the bodies of government jointly with NGOs. It is planned, to conduct in Kyiv
II International donor conference on assistance to deported persons in Ukraine.
Political – legal area.
The most important
issue in the political – legal area is an obtaining citizenship of
Ukraine by deported peoples. After the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the
Law ”On Making changes and additions into Law of Ukraine” ”On citizenship of
Ukraine” on 16 April 1997, which came into force from 20 May 1997, the
procedure of obtaining citizenship was significantly simplified for a
considerable number of deportees.
Another step in this
direction became the Agreement ”On simplified procedure of giving citizenship
of Uzbekistan up for Crimean Tatars” between Ukraine and Uzbekistan from 4
September 1998, under which the deportees and their progeny were exempted from
obligatory duties necessary for affirmation of a belonging to citizenship of
Ukraine.
Information.
The realization of this agreement
jointly with local authorities promoted the increase of addresses of deported
Crimean Tatars relating to the recognition of citizenship of Ukraine. Thus, if
from 13 November 1991 till 1 September 1998, 7 500 deportees applied for a confirmation
of their citizenship of Ukraine to bodies of Internal Affairs, from 1 September
1998 until 1 September 2000, 53 647 deportees and their progeny applied for
that period of Agreement between Ukraine and Uzbekistan, or 86, 2 % of all
deportees returned to Crimea from Uzbekistan after adoption the Law on
citizenship by Republic of Uzbekistan.
However, in spite of the actual
violations of the rights of repatriates to obtain a citizenship of Ukraine, a
significant number of deported persons returned to Ukraine didn’t become
citizens, because of an onerous procedure of relinquishment of citizenship of
state of departure. Therefore the defined directions will be in permanent
attention of the bodies of government.
The problem of a
rebirth and development of education and culture of the former deported Crimean
Tatars coming back for domicile to Ukraine is important as well. It is
necessary to recognize that the appropriate consideration of the solution of
urgent social issues has not been given. However, the present situation in the
educational-cultural area of former deported peoples is gradually changing for
the better.
Information.
”The Program of
establishment and development of educational institutions, classes in Ukrainian,
Crimean Tatar, schools and classes with two languages education” regulates the
process of development of a national education (approved by resolution of
Council of Ministers of Autonomous Republic of Crimea from 27.08.97 #260) that
envisages the opening of 40 schools for Crimean Tatars to 2000. Currently there
are 6 schools in Crimean Tatar, 2 – with two languages education, 53 classes in
Crimean Tatar and 8 ones with two languages education.
For the realization
of the Program of special training for national specialists, the Republican
Commission (ARC) on the distribution of special directives, in 1999, gave 96
assignments of 15 professions to 15 Institutions of higher learning, including
88 ones for Crimean Tatars.
The Crimean State
Industrial-Pedagogical Institution, Simferopol State University trains national
specialists, which have the faculties of study the Crimean Tatar language and
literatures, Turkish and Greek philology as well. Future teachers of the
Crimean Tatar language study at the Simferopol Pedagogical Institute.
State Educational
Institutions of the Ministry of Culture and Art train actors and producers,
employers of clubhouses and libraries of number of Crimean Tatar young people.
40% pupils of Crimean Art College are Crimean Tatars.
The national
editorial offices of telecast for Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks
and Germans by State tele-radio company ”Krim” were established.
The religious life
of Moslems of peninsula quickened and develops, in legal area of Ukraine, for
years of independence. However, a sore issue in activity of majority of them
staying a providing of religious buildings. The appropriate buildings for a
providing of religious needs of believers lesser than half of them are Moslems.
In Autonomous Republic of Crimea, for realization of decrees and directions of
President of Ukraine, instructions of Council of Ministers, from 1995, passed
to property or for using 54 mosques and built 15 new ones. Among them are the
noble monuments of architecture and culture of Crimean Tatar People, as
Khan-Dzhami in Evpatoriya and mosque of Uzbek in Starii Krim. According to
recovery schedule of religious buildings which not using or besides the
purpose, was made for realization of the direction of Council of Ministers of
Ukraine from 7 May 1998, #290, in current year 11 mosques will be transmitted
and still one in 2000. The allotment of lands for Moslem cemeteries will be
regulated and controlled by local authorities
However a number of issues in
humanitarian area not find the practical realization. Besides, forming a
social-economical situation doesn’t allow finding an opportunity for
restoration of the material and technical base of national schools, medical
programs, books and other literature in Crimean Tatar lost during deportation
or construction of new one.
The
Crimean Tatar music – dramatic theatre enjoying wide popularity among Crimean
Tatars is required a financing, because is a dangerous structure, all works on
its reconstruction because of lack of funds was stopped. It is required a
solution of issues relating to stable financing of State budget and partially
Republican for program of restoration and development of the monuments of
history, culture and architecture of Crimean Tatars.
Taking into account aforesaid, should admit,
that didn’t make a legal rehabilitation of the victims of national sign, the
issues connected with return, resettlement and restoration of the rights of
deported peoples legally were not regulated, that for one’s turn, complicate a
solution of their integration into Ukraine. Existing conditions, and not
sufficient financing of a resettlement of former deported peoples, who returned
to Ukraine, are a reason of a social – economical and political tension in
separate regions of Ukraine, including Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In this
connection, a constant attention and solution of general, urgent issues of
former deported peoples by Council of Ministers, and Parliament of Ukraine is a
security of peace and harmony in our state.
CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
Crimea is a strategically important
region of the south-eastern foreign policy orientations of Ukraine and a key
juncture of the pathways to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Losing
control over Crimea would greatly jeopardize the Ukrainian State’s national
security and national interests. The Crimean problem gains in importance far
beyond the frames of the domestic situation in Ukraine. As to the restoration
of Crimea’s autonomy, Ukraine has given up its own interests to a considerable
extent, in favor of external forces, but at the same time it continues to bear
responsibility for the region’s stability and security.
Since
1745, Crimea belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and since 1772 it was formally
independent. Empress Katherine II’s Manifesto of April 8, 1783 finally joined
Crimea to the Russian Empire. In the period 1917-1920 revolutionary events, the
Bolsheviks' government established the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the
membership of the Russian Federation, which existed until 1945. In 1954,
Crimea was transferred to Ukraine as an ordinary oblast; for reasons of
economic management. The later claims of the Russians on Crimea have no legal
basis because the act of transfer was in compliance with the laws of the USSR.
Equally,
the calls of Crimean separatists to create an independent sovereignty do not
also have enough substantial reasons, as the “Russian-speaking” population does
not form a separate ethnic community. The presence of a large number of ethnic
Russians in Crimea also cannot be a sufficient ground for creation of a local
statehood, as in that case one should speak about the entire South-Eastern
region, and other regions of Ukraine, where many Russians live as well. Thus,
it concerns the identity of the Ukrainian state as a whole: should it be
Ukrainian or should it belong to Russia? But such a question is out of place
and would be impertinent here.
The
Crimean Tatar factor should be recognized as the single legal grounds for the
creation of Crimean autonomy. The long history of the Crimean Khanate
contributed to ethnic consolidation and led to the formation of the particular
Crimean Tatars’ ethnic entity. However, its historical destiny under the
conditions of the Russian – Soviet Empire was rather tragic, and its right for
self-determination was not duly taken into account during the great upheavals
of the 20th century. The growing number of the migrants from Ukraine
and Russia, and, on the other hand, the Crimean Tatars’ migration to Turkey in
the 18th-19th centuries created a situation where an
exclusively ethnic statehood might turn into a tool for suppressing new
migrants, who constituted the main part of the population in Crimean towns and
significantly contributed to the economic modernization of the peninsula.
Therefore,
when in 1918-1920 a real opportunity for the creation of Crimean autonomy
emerged, the presence of the Crimean Tatar ethnic entity, with certain state
and cultural traditions, was the main justification for it. But the nature of
such autonomy could not be entirely ethnic. Crimea’s autonomy can only exist
as a means for co-ordination of the interests of the Crimean Tatars and other
ethnic groups of the population of the peninsula. As soon as the Crimean
Tatars were deported, the necessity for such autonomy had fallen away and
Crimea turned into an ordinary region. However, with the Crimean Tatars'
return, the objective need for autonomy is again emerging, as the situation of
1918-1920 is being replicated.
The creation of an entirely ethnic autonomy in Crimea is
virtually impossible, no matter how much some Crimean Tatar politicians wished
to obtain it. Existence of Crimean autonomy without the Crimean Tatars is
impossible at all, no matter how much some "Russian-speaking"
politicians long for it. Thus, an appropriate consolidating ideology of
co-existence is required, which reflects the interests of the different strata
of the population of Crimea. And such ideology can be formed only proceeding
from the appropriate comprehension of the objective nature of the Crimean
statehood paradigm.
A system of local
self-government should have been built, as a matter of fact, proceeding from an
understanding of the character of Crimean autonomy; i.e., to provide the
Crimean Tatar ethnic group with significant rights within the republican
structures. As we know, this has not taken place owing to the local political
elite’s aspirations for unlimited autonomy, and on account of insufficient
attention to Crimean problems on the part of Kyiv. Although opportunities for
certain amendments to the status of Crimea still remain, and are conditioned
upon the appropriate approach of Kyiv towards the adoption of a new
Constitution for the Crimean Republic.
The new constitution complies with the interests of Ukraine and
with the interests of the stability and security in the whole Black Sea region
to keep to the strategy of forming a legitimate Crimean autonomy.
No
matter how many myths are created around “Khrushchev’s gift”, the transfer of
Crimea from the Russian Federation to Ukraine in 1954, but within the
contemporary context it should be recognized that such a state of affairs
turned out to be safer and more acceptable for the post-Soviet period. If
Crimea had continued to be under Moscow’s guardianship, the Crimean Tatars’
resettlement, which started on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, would have
had the same spontaneous and disorderly nature; and the Moscow power
establishment, engaged in domestic affairs and disposed to solving conflicts by
force, undoubtedly would have provoked another Chechnya, which would have
brought to destruction all the economy of the peninsula as well as caused a
considerable outflow of the “Russian-speaking” population to the South of
Ukraine.
As a consequence, the Crimean Tatar people would have been
either completely exterminated or established an Islamic fundamentalist state,
because this type of national consolidation is capable of withstanding a great
power’s military interference, as can be seen in Afghanistan or Chechnya.
Such a state would have obviously found itself in
geopolitical isolation and be a center of international terrorism and the drug
business, a center for criminal elements from the whole territory of the former
USSR. Thus, a much greater danger to both Ukrainian and Russian national
security would have been generated. In such conditions, even the joining of
Crimea to Turkey would have been a lesser evil, because, at least, a certain
order would exist in Crimea.
The belonging of Crimea to Ukraine effectively reduced
the tension in the peninsula. Kyiv authorities, occupied by the problems of
state-building, were not advocates of force. Therefore, they were compelled to
agree with creation of Crimean autonomy, in such a way, as to localize the
increasing internal conflict between the local population and Crimean Tatar
returnees. On the other hand, it was a concession to the Crimean separatists,
who were aiming at the return of Crimea back to Moscow's guardianship.
So
to say, the mutual neutralization of the opposed parties took place, and the
conflict did not take on a serious scale. At the same time, Kiev received a
strategic benefit, because it occupied the position of an outside arbiter, to
which the both parties apply and defer. And though this factor in no way
facilitated the solving of the
peninsula’s problems, “the game of expectations” did its part in preventing
conflict’s further escalation, by virtue of the time factor.
Various sociological inquiries and the results of the
elections to local bodies of the government of Crimea testify to the presence
of certain separatist tendencies in this region. However, it rather indicates a
dominant "pro-Union" mentality of the autonomy's population, rather
than the population's desire for a separate nation. The population’s
discontent, connected with the general economic crisis in Ukraine, also
contributed to this. The population does not see realistic prospects for the
improvement of its welfare, and has certain illusions that the situation can be
improved as a result of changing the status of Crimea. In the light of the
economic difficulties, the legal field is being destroyed; political and/or
economic terrorism is increasing; the fight for political influence between
different groups of local elite is escalating.
The ethnic-political
aspect of the issue. Two opposite
concepts of vision of the Crimean Tatar issue can be distinguished. The
difference between them is rooted in the basic definition: are the Crimean
Tatars a separate people, a nation, entitled to its own territory and
its own political life with all the ensuing consequences, up to the right to
establish an independent state, or should the Crimean Tatars be treated as an
ethnic minority, an ethnic entity, along with other ethnic groups that live
in Ukraine, and then their rights include only ensuring an ethnic-cultural
autonomy and equal civil rights.
Both concepts have their proponents and opponents, both
are connected with rather serious arguments and substantiation, caused by the
interests and goals of certain political forces. The ways to solve a problem
are sorted out according to the accepted model of seeing a problem. In the
former case, emphasis is placed on the people’s political rights, the latter
approach focuses on social-economic issues.
It is obvious that the Crimean Tatars consider themselves
an individual nation which has the right for political self-determination. This
concept is historically substantiated. For a long time there existed a feudal
state ruled by the Crimean Tatar Khans, and though it was autonomous within the
Ottoman Empire, nevertheless it molded rather durable experience of political
and national life, with its memories still influencing modern Crimean Tatar
politicians.
At the First Kurultai (People’s Assembly) of the Crimean
Tatar people on June 29, 1991 a list of the Crimean Tatar movement’s objectives
was put forward. In addition to the tasks, related with elimination of the
genocide consequences, with making steps towards the return and resettlement of
the Crimean Tatars in their historical homeland, with rebirth of the ethnic
culture, the task was set also to restore the Crimean Tatar people’s national
and political rights and exercise their right for free national-statehood
and self-determination on their national territory.
In 1991 this formula appeared utopian enough and was
meant rather to serve as a banner for a new consolidation of the Crimean Tatar
people around it under the conditions which followed their political
rehabilitation and the 1944 deportation act’s condemnation, with the onset of
the full-scale process of the Crimean Tatars' return to Crimea. And though
later, in order to prevent conflicts between local and Kyiv movers and shakers,
this slogan was deleted as the final goal of the political strife. Nonetheless, this formula revealed a rather
high level of self-consciousness of the Crimea Tatar people and its political
elite.
The other position, which views the Crimean Tatars as an
ethnic minority, is virtually fixed in Ukraine’s legal environment. It is held
both by the local Crimean politicians and Kyiv authorities. It is Ukraine’s official stance on the
issue. Ukraine’s legislation on ethnic minorities is rather well developed and
fully meets the ethnic minorities’ national and cultural rights. It is believed
that there are no particular grounds to single out the Crimean Tatars from
among other ethnic groups living in Ukraine. Moreover, it is stressed that
Ukraine devotes much more attention to the Crimean Tatar people than other
ethnic minorities, and carries, virtually single-handed, the entire burden of
the Crimean Tatar returnees’ accommodation, though Ukraine is in no way
responsible for the deportation act just for that simple reason that Crimea
joined Ukraine several years later.
Moscow’s political circles, that are oriented towards the
local “Russian-speaking” population in Crimea, also advocate that position. The
arsenal of arguments in its support is traced down to the denial of the Crimean Tatars’ rights for Crimea’s
territory and establishment of their own State, as historically unsubstantiated.
Appeals
to the times of Crimean Tatar Khans are regarded as unjustified, the same as
all similar historical arguments, for otherwise it would be necessary to change
a lot on today’s map of the world, leading to great conflicts. So, it would be
proper to proceed from those realities, which have developed. It is also noted
that in addition to the Crimean Tatars, other peoples were also deported from
Crimea in different times - Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Germans - who have
rights to the territory, too. The Crimean Tatars’ cultural and ethnic identity
is not questioned by anyone, however, they are recognized as just one of the
ethnic minorities and nothing more.
On the whole, notwithstanding the ideological background,
this position is distinguished with a certain degree of pragmatism: it is
necessary to deal with the accommodation process and economy, to seek a rise in
people’s living standards to a level of decency, leaving apart political games
of any kind. This model essentially denies that the seizure of power is the way
to a better life.
Between these two extreme stands one can find moderate
ones, which are milder and based on compromise. One of them tends to the
dominant position and is tied to the recognition of the Crimean Tatar’s right
for ethnic-territorial autonomy. In this case it is possible to preserve
the Ukrainian State’s integrity, while partly realizing the Crimean Tatar
people’s right for self-determination.
True, it should be admitted that the establishment of the
Crimea’s autonomy in the 20s and 30s was scarcely substantiated without
consideration of the Crimean Tatars, who had formed their rather influential
national movement in the years of the Russian revolution.
Nevertheless,
the real state of affairs is the “Russian-speaking” population’s dominance in
Crimea, a weighty enough argument against making the Crimean Autonomous
Republic ethnic-specific. Properly speaking, it is not a case of Russians or
Ukrainians in Crimea, rather a “Russian-speaking” population, a specific
extra-ethnic category, composed of the post-war migrants from all over the
USSR.
This
dominant stratum of the Crimean
population might be more aptly called with the former title “Soviet people,”
because it is rather mixed and incorporates not only ethnic Russians or
Ukrainians. It is hardly formed by ideas, raised upon either Russian or
Ukrainian nationalism, and it is rather easy to cause a nostalgia for the
former times of relative welfare and peace, which, by the way, is successfully
exploited by the pro-Communist propaganda.
The
Russian nationalist-patriots have been also increasing their efforts toward
turning Crimea into a purely Russian national autonomy with the constant threat
of separation. So far, their actions have not scored any significant success.
It
may be assumed that the Crimean republic, in prospect, can assume the nature of
an ethnic-territorial autonomy, given the demographic balance there radically
changing in favor of the Crimean Tatars. It may be either as a result of this
ethnic entity’s fast natural growth, or as a result of a new massive tide of
migration, including also the Crimean Tatars from Turkey. In the former case
the process would require a rather long time, several generations, and that
would allow to fulfill the idea of the Crimean Tatars’ tolerant incorporation
in the Ukrainian society. In the latter case a situation would appear, very
much similar to the formation of the Israeli State, and that would be fraught
with serious conflicts.
Another intermediate position proceeds from defining the
Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people. This notion is present in the
Constitution of Ukraine. An indigenous people is viewed as a kind of ethnic
minority, which demands special legal mechanisms for exercising its rights. The
special laws and legal norms of the International Law determine its particular
status and relationships with the State. This position is meant for reconciling
the idea of the Crimean Tatar people’s special self-identity with its actual
legal definition as an ethnic minority. Thus, it allows to partly meet the
Crimean Tatars’ national ambitions without violating Ukraine’s current laws and
legal norms.
The documents, which were adopted by the all-people’s
assembly of the Crimean Tatars (Kurultai) in 1997, among the basic guidelines
of the newly elected ruling body of the Crimean Tatar movement, Mejlis, stated
the task to press for the recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as the indigenous
people, and to stand for Crimea’s status as a national-territorial
autonomy within Ukraine, based on the Crimean Tatar people’s inalienable
right to self-determination.
It should be noted here that compromises are a good
thing, but very often they serve as mere tactical tools to settle the most
acute discrepancies. The dominant trend is toward favoring one of the two
previous models, that is the right to statehood or an ethnic minority’s rights.
By-and-large, the existent ethnic-political situation in
Crimea may be described as a certain fluctuant movement around some neutral
point, which is accepted by the majority: "the Crimean Tatars are an ethnic
minority with the special historical and cultural rights in the Crimean
context". And all other trends of conceptualization stem from this,
according with political interests and priorities.
In the domain of politics, the most burning issue is the
official recognition of Mejlis as the authorized representative body of the
Crimean Tatar people. The task of defining the Mejlis within Ukraine’s legal
environment was set, in a clear-cut manner, by the 1996 Kurultai among the
Crimean Tatar movement's’ topmost priorities.
The Crimean Tatar political elite sees such recognition
as a guarantee for further solving all other problems relating to the Crimean
Tatars’ accommodation and development as a nation, while the opponents of the
Mejlis's recognition notice here increasing efforts in the direction of forming
an independent Crimean Tatar State in prospect. Thus, the very fact of raising
the issue of the Mejlis’s recognition makes the two opposing stands clash about
the alternative: are the Crimean Tatars a nation or an ethnic minority? In
other words, is it worth to convey the Crimean Tatar problem into the
political sphere or should the possibilities for its solution be
restricted within the ethnic-cultural dimension?
The Ideology Notion of
"Returning".
As a result of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation on May
18-19, 1944, a total of 238,500 persons were evicted, 46 percent of whom
perished in the deportation places. The basic underlying reason for the
deportation was the entire people’s collective responsibility for
“collaboration with the (German) invaders.”
Paradoxically,
this fact indirectly testifies to recognition of the Crimean Tatars as a nation
by the then USSR’s rulers. The act of genocide actually contributed to the
Crimean Tatars’ greater consolidation, as a nation that is persecuted.
Under
the forced exile conditions (most of them were deported to Uzbekistan), they
were banned from leaving their places of settlement, and violations entailed
criminal prosecution.
Even
after the totalitarian regime somewhat weakened its tight grip with the 1956
Edict by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium “On Withdrawing the Restrictions in
Regard to the Crimean Tatars’ Special Settlement,” declaring as “inexpedient”
further detention of the Crimean Tatars’ in the special settlements,
nevertheless, the ban remained in regard to their return to Crimea, and no
compensation was provided for the loss of the property.
The
restrictions themselves fixed the Crimean Tatars’ integrity as a people,
preventing them from being eroded and naturally mixed with the local
population.
When an ethnic group is placed in exceptional conditions:
either in a favored position (as, for instance, the Russians) or in a
discriminated, in other words, when it is politically alienated out of the
general environment, then the process of national consolidation inevitably
intensifies. The ethnic entity starts searching for political mechanisms to
safeguard its rights, and accordingly the national self-consciousness is being
formed. In the '60-'80-s the Crimean Tatar national movement emerged, which
triggered the persecutions on the part of the authorities, and thus a new
strengthening of the consolidation processes.
The first massive protest actions in all the areas where
the Crimean Tatars resided were held during the celebrations, which marked the
45th anniversary of the Crimean Autonomous Republic’s establishment.
In September 1967 activists of the Crimean Tatar movement convened a
clandestine congress in Leninabad. The movement’s leaders established contacts
with liberal intellectuals, who supported the movement of human rights advocacy
(Ukrainian General P. Grygorenko’s role was significant in this process), and,
through them, with the global community. As a result, the Edict was adopted by
the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1967, which generally rehabilitated the
Crimean Tatar people, though its right to return to Crimea was hushed down.
In the so-called Perestroika years, when the totalitarian
regime’s pressure significantly eased, a new tide of the Crimean Tatar movement
came. The Crimean Tatars’ demonstration in Moscow on June 20, 1987 evoked
compassion and caused wide resonance in the State. The Soviet State’s leaders
started to deal with the Crimean Tatar problems as worrying about the Soviet
Union’s international image.
In November 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the
Declaration “On Recognizing As Illegal and Criminal the Reprisal Acts Against
the Peoples Subjected to Forcible Deportation and On Securing Their Rights.”
The Crimean Regional Soviet Executive Committee adopted a resolution to allot
8,400 land lots to the Crimean Tatars. It was from that moment that the massive,
but poorly controlled, process of resettlement of thousands of Crimean Tatars
returning to Ukraine’s Crimean Region.
The demand for implementation of the Crimean Tatars’
right to return to Crimea has become the paramount consolidating idea that the
emerging Crimean Tatar political elite was armed with. And the issue was raised
in regard to the return of the people, not separate social groups who survived
1944 victimization and the subsequent period of exile. As a matter of fact, few
of the deportees have survived a half a century. The problem more involved the
victims’ descendants, who, after the repressive limitations were cancelled,
could rather fully enjoy the civil rights on par with other population groups
in the Central Asiatic republics.
How genuine their desire to return to Crimea was, it is
sometimes a dubious matter. For the moving process is always painful and it is
connected with hardships in adjusting to new dwelling environments, with
difficulties and losses. Moreover, the migrants could presume that they will
not be warmly welcomed at all by the local population in a new place of living,
and that their arrival will be met with suspicion by local authorities,
unprepared to efficiently solve the problems which did not occur before.
All these factors suggest that the idea of returning had
to be appealing and potent enough to prompt large masses of people to leave
their habitual places of living.
In the typologically similar situation the “return” of
Jews to their historical homeland was substantiated by the German Nazis’
massive reprisals, with millions of Jews having been exterminated and many
having emigrated and seeing no reason to come back to the former places of
living. The ideological seeds of “returning” in that case found a rather fertile
soil, with the post-war international situation facilitating the idea’s
materialization, too.
But
what were the grounds that the idea of the Crimean Tatars’ return to Crimea
could rely on ? Hopes for a better future could hardly be a strong enough motivation.
Rather, the memories about the past reprisals played their instrumental role,
along with hopes for the people’s statehood, historical and cultural memories
of Crimea’s landscapes, and so on.
The
idea of “returning” was, in fact, the Crimean Tatars’ response to the challenge
to their historical existence as a people, a response to the act of genocide
and subsequent reprisals, mirroring the people’s strife for preserving their
dignity and significance, all of which could not be possible to materialize
outside the Crimean context.
The fact that the return motivation was based on the
understandable feeling of protest against the 1944 genocide act may be attested
by the fact that the migration drive did not at all involve the Crimean Tatars
who live in Turkey. So, obviously more powerful motives were necessary than the
“restitution of historical justice.” It could not altogether excluded that in a
more distant future the idea of a strong Crimean Tatar State may become the
propellant, and in that case the Crimean Tatar problem is certain to assume
quite a new qualitative dimension.
As of January 1, 1998, a total of 262,800 ex-deportees
returned to the Crimean Autonomous Republic. According to the Crimean Interior
Agency, the number included 259,000 Crimean Tatars and 3,800 Armenians,
Bulgarians, Greeks and Germans. As figures by the Crimean State Committee for
matters of nationalities and ex-deportees suggest, up to 220,000-250,000
Crimean Tatars remain outside Crimea, and the figures basically coincide with
estimates by the Mejlis.
However,
there are other estimations provided by experts at the Crimean sociological
service Krym Sotsis who applied different survey techniques, which suggest that
the aggregate number of Crimean Tatars within the CIS boundaries does not
exceed 350,000. There is also an opinion about thousands of Crimean Tatars
holding permanent or interim residence permits, living in Crimea, but having no
Ukrainian citizenship (they are formally citizens of other countries, primarily
Uzbekistan).
In
some surveys the number of Crimean Tatars is calculated twice, based on the
numbers of those holding residence permits and those who possess Ukrainian
citizenship. A special term emerged, the so-called “seasonal Tatars,” as many
of the Crimean Tatars appear in Crimea for periods, necessary to build
dwellings. It is practically impossible to establish who of these Tatars are
from Crimea or from among the deportees’ descendants. As of today, the legal
notion of the “deported peoples” exists which effectively covers all
individuals who belong to the listed nationalities living on the CIS
territory....
As
of today, the share of the deported citizens in the population of the Crimean
Autonomous Republic (barring Sevastopol) has reached 11.9 percent. In the
districts of Bakhchisarai, Kirovsk, Pervomaisk, Radyansky, Dzhankoi and
Simferopol it ranges between 20 percent and 25 percent, while in the Bilogirsk
district it is estimated at 33 percent of the total populace.
Since 1991, funding of the measures, connected with the
ex-deportees’ return and accommodation, has been almost exclusively made at the
expense of the funds, allotted from the
national budget of Ukraine. Regrettably, the budget allotments for this purpose
have been continuously shrinking. And even the scarce available means have not
always been properly disposed of. This has resulted in sluggish rates of social
infrastructure development, which has been slowing the housing construction
effort.
The
current legislation still imposes certain legal barriers, which impede the
obtaining of Ukrainian citizenship by the Crimean Tatar returnees. At present,
64,000 Crimean Tatars do not have citizenship. Absence of citizenship, in its
turn, bars the Crimean Tatar returnees from participation in privatization,
elections, civil service, from joining queues for receipt of dwelling,
education, etc.
Crimea’s Autonomy and Prospects for Further
Evolution of the Crimean Tatar Idea. The very existence of an
autonomous territorial entity within the framework of a unitary national state
is a paradox. Equally illusory are all opinions about the “multinational
Crimean people’ which are obviously meant for a gullible public. Actually, the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) is a Russian-speaking post-Union semi-state
formation which resulted from an unfavorable to Ukraine compromise of interests
of Moscow’s and Kyiv’s political elite.
The
ARC’s existence cannot be explained by the great number of Russian residents,
since in many other regions of Ukraine the proportions of ethnic Russians are
greater, though no one seriously raises an issue of setting up new autonomies,
say, in Donetsk or Lugansk.
The sole justification of Crimean autonomy’s existence is
precisely the Crimean Tatar factor. Yet the CAR’s was established neither as an
ethnic-territorial autonomy nor to serve the Crimean Tatars’ interests. Rather,
it should be recognized that it was established precisely for countering the
migration movement under the conditions of the situation, when neither Moscow
nor Kyiv, both preoccupied with their problems, could deal with the Crimean
Tatars.
On
the other hand, the CAR creation was a pre-emptive step to prevent the Crimean
Tatar returnees from demanding their ethnic-territorial autonomy after their
return. Viewed from this angle, the Crimean Autonomous Republic was a peculiar
tool to strengthen the local power response to the expected results of the
return. Partly it was an instrument
towards self-organization of the Crimean Russian-speaking population to
safeguard their material and political interests.
As can be seen, “historical justice” has its limits, too.
Sometimes attempts to return to the past grow into new acts of “historical
injustice” in regard of the current state of affairs.
However historically justified the foundation of Israeli
State may be, the coin’s other side is the extreme injustice towards the
Palestinian people. A similar situation might have occurred, if a purely ethnic
by its nature Crimean Tatar State had been established.
So,
it would be much better to put aside all these arguments in support of
historical justice. The Russophone population’s dominance in Crimea’s authority
bodies cannot be accepted, either. The correct view of Crimea’s autonomy would
be as a mechanism to solve conflicts and disputes and balance the interests
of the Crimean Tatars and those of the local population, a tool towards the
Crimean Tatars’ tolerant integration into the system of Ukraine’s civic
society.
Should the CAR be unable to perform this paramount
function, the issue could be raised about the expediency of its further
existence.
Really, the Crimean Tatars’ ethnic rights as an ethnic
minority can fully be met through the Kyiv central authority’s mechanisms.
Based on the active mechanisms for adjusting interests of the Crimean
population’s various strata, an ideology may be formed of co-existence of
diverse ethnic entities, which will facilitate the situation’s stabilization
and will reduce the probability of undesirable processes surfacing to
jeopardize Ukraine’s national interests.
Regrettably,
certain aspects of the situation’s analysis fail to give solid grounds for
optimism with regard to the likelihood of such mechanisms shortly being created
in Crimea. This is primarily connected with the conflict situations which have
repeatedly developed over the past years between the Crimean Tatars and
Crimea’s local authorities. Such conflicts but mirror Crimea’s profound
inherent discrepancies.
Certain processes in the Crimean Tatar society’s
development cannot but cause apprehensions as inviting to dual interpretation
of these as the natural processes of the Crimean Tatars’ ethnic-cultural
revival and as the Crimean Tatars boosting their political potential. Risks are
high of the Crimean society and the Crimean Tatar community embarking on
parallel or non-convergent development modes, which may really result in a major conflict.
Vis-a-vis the deepening economic crisis and inability to
solve elementary problems of survival, with proprietary rights fixed by active
legislation not meaningfully enough, and the CAR’s citizens equally lacking
adequate legal protection, the probability is high for extending the influence
of the ideological postulate which specifies that the Crimean Tatar people is
Crimea’s sole sovereign vested with the priority right to the peninsula’s
riches, such as lands, water, mineral deposits, facilities, etc.
While admitting the historical legality of the “Crimean
Tatar idea,” which is focused on the “returning” concept, it would be too naive
to think that, once the Crimean Tatars complete their return and settlement in
Crimea, the idea will discontinue its evolution toward incorporating new
dominants and values instead of the returning idea, which has materialized.
It
would be very consistent on the part of the Crimean Tatars to make next step
toward developing a national consolidation ideology, aimed at gradually forming
a Crimean Tatar State, the ultimate mode of self-determination.
And though, for the time being, the Crimean Tatar
movement’s leaders a voice no such desire, Ukrainian analysts are strongly
recommended to scrutinize this scenario, as well. And it is not the issue of
whether such trends and intentions really exist, overtly or covertly, within
the Crimean Tatar movement, among its leaders or allies abroad.
The
present Crimean Tatar elite have been manifestly demonstrating their loyalty to
the Ukrainian State. Rather, the issue should be raised as a question: is it
create a Crimean Tatar State and under what conditions could this hypothetical
idea be embodied in the politicians’ real slogans and actions ?
If this is
impossible, then suspicions and apprehensions which have been voiced by quite a
few analysts, may be interpreted as a deliberately concocted myth behind which
there are certain political forces, who are interested in provoking tensions in
relations between Kyiv and Bakhchisarai, Kyiv and Ankara. Let us assume,
though, that it is not a myth and attempt at scientifically modeling the
hypothetical situation. And let us hope for the Crimean Tatars’ due
understanding of the attempt.
True enough, such an ideology is
quite probable to be assumed by the Crimean Tatars, if they perceive themselves
as a nation, rather than an ethnic minority. A nation’s political development
quite logically leads to the need of securing the right to determine their
destiny on their own. Besides, after some time, changes may be expected within
the Crimean Tatar political elite, with a new generation of leaders surfacing,
who were basically trained in schools and colleges of the southern limitrophe
state and who may hold far more radical views and cherish freedom-loving
aspirations, as is normally inherent in youth.
Very often utterances have been made
about the Mejlis as presently playing the role of the Crimean parallel
government, the government of the Crimean Tatars, with all the necessary
departments and divisions. It should be taken into account that the Crimean
Tatar movement is something more than just a political party, though it would
be not quite correct to appraise it in national-legal terms.
One may labor under a misapprehension that within Crimea’s
self-government system some elements of the Crimean Tatar people’s statehood
are being deliberately instilled. In reality, there is the Crimean Tatars’
autonomous self-government system with its vertical managerial structure: the
Mejlis, district Mejlises and village Mejlises. This organisational mode allows
the Mejlis to pursue its policies and exercise control over the Crimean Tatar
movement. The Mejlis runs its own media, including radio and tv channels and
the press. Another peculiarity of the Crimean Tatar societal organization is in
facilitating and fostering multitudinous associations along professional and
other lines.
With the Ukrainian State’s ceding
its ground, more favorable environments may evolve to feed such intentions and
sentiments, particularly in the international context. And even with today’s
demographic balance in Crimea, the Crimean Tatar radicals may well raise the
issue of a new “restoration of historical justice,” styled after the year 1783.
Should this happen, Ukraine, as usual, might find itself in total international
isolation, with no external moral and material support, and very likely to be branded
as the oppressor of other peoples. It might be assumed, as well, that to
“rescue” the situation and defend the Russophone population in Crimea Russian
“peacekeeping contingents” could be sent on a mission there to thus prologue
Crimea’s incorporation in the Russian Federation.
The region’s problems, if viewed
from the geopolitical angle, make it necessary to pinpoint yet another subject
who is not interested in the Crimean Tatar people’s integration into
the Ukrainian society and in looking for ways to achieve understanding between
Mejlis leaders and the Ukrainian state. The subject is the Russian vector of
influence on the regional processes. Considering its own specific interests,
this vector, though with certain reservations, may be divided into several
components, that is, the Russian Federation (the leadership, special services,
political parties, economic clans, etc.), the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea’s
pro-Russian political forces.
Retaining Russia’s control over
Black Sea regional developments requires its consolidated footing in the
Crimean peninsula (the paramount naval base in Sevastopol).. This problem
assumes particular significance from the angle of promising projects for
transportation of Caspian oil, particularly following Russia having to cede
some ground in the South Caucasus. The need to consolidate Russia’s stand also
stems from the ongoing process of NATO’s enlargement, as the “second wave” will
most likely include some Black sea countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria.
With the Crimean Tatars’ problems
remaining unregulated, official Russia may feel entitled, if its relations with
Ukraine worsen, to solve two intertwined problems, that is, supporting Crimea’s
ethno-political situation as misbalanced as it is, in case Kiev raised the
issue of the BSF or Sevastopol in too harsh a language, and creating an
atmosphere of suspicions between Ukraine and Turkey with a view of objectively
increasing Russia’s geopolitical weight in the Black Sea Region.
Chechnya’s example shows how
difficult, if not altogether impossible, is the task of coping with a people
who are determined to fight to the last toward their national independence, and
who receive sizeable material and moral support from abroad.
However, under Crimea’s conditions a
Chechen-style scenario might result in Crimea’s total secession, which would be
economically inexpedient, or in forming enclaves of warring communities, such
as those in Lebanon or Cyprus. However improbable this scenario may appear,
even less probable ones have been witnessed by modern history.
The big question is whether Ukraine
is prepared to weather such historical contingencies. And should Ukraine step
up its defense effort in the South? Or, maybe, it would be more appropriate to
work out more favorable strategies.
The
Crimean Tatar problem is among those on which Ukraine’s domestic and foreign
political situation hinges. This is connected with the Crimean Tatar factor’s
may lead to the potential conflict. On the other hand, taking into account this
factor may play an essential stabilizing role in the Crimean situation, which
is very significant from the angle of Ukraine’s national security.
The myths of the Islamic menace, the
Mejlis as the shadow power of an extremist nature, a massive exodus of Crimean
Tatars from Turkey looming on the horizon, harbor vast negative potential as
influencing the Ukrainian political elite’s orientation. Ukraine has neglected
its own national interests in virtually rejecting real support from and any
dialogue with its natural ally in Crimea, the pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatar
political elite. Fears of the hypothetical and mythical Islamic threat may turn
into the very real menace of totally losing Crimea.
The Crimean Tatar separatists’ vocal opposition to the
Mejlis, attempts to exploit the “second power” myth, all these result from the
Mejlis being viewed as a real and strong enemy, which prevents the separatists
from materializing their intentions.
Utterances about all nationalities
in Crimea being equal and about this presupposing no grounds to single out some
ethnic entity, and about Crimea having been historically populated by many of
ethnic groups, etc., all these are but speculations, meant for exploiting
ignorance and for virtually perpetuating the “Russophone” factor in Crimea.
The Principles of the Problem’s
Solution. New realities of modernity have highlighted the need for a more
comprehensive approach to rethinking and understanding Ukraine’s developmental
problems in the context of existent situations and in terms of likely
strategies for the near future.
A study into the balance of and
interactions between the situations in Crimea and Ukraine as a whole allows to
see a complex and controversial picture of diverse trends, which are deeply
rooted in the past’s mentality patterns and which may be connected, as well,
with hopes for renewal and aspirations toward being adequately involved in the
global civilization processes.
It would be important in this
connection to outline certain points in the public’s vision of the situation
which lead to realistic prospects for the future. Such an approach is
particularly significant in view of the assumption that despite all the
differences among the models of a desirable future, which are being supported
by political forces in Crimea, there is still some commonly shared ground in
the vast space of existent probabilities, with regard to values and contents,
which it would be prudent to use as a nucleus for drafting strategies of
further development.
The parties may argue without finding
some common understanding with regard to the past, but what concerns the future
is need for a solution by seeking for common ground and agreement. Otherwise we
would be compelled to sacrifice prudence for the sake of emotions and that
would result in an impasse. The examples are within easy reach. The lasting
Israeli-Arab conflict testifies to the fact that problems are easily generated
by mutual reluctance to cede one’s ground and then are very hard to solve
without resorting to radical means.
The nature of the current situation
in Ukraine and Crimea can hardly be explained through applying simple
explanations to very complex and unique processes. Quite often, the causes are
seen in the actions and motives of political leaders, parties, and movements.
However, it is clear that difficult economic conditions could provide a footing
for the regions’ succession, where ethic and cultural tensions could take the
fore.
Crimea’s autonomy emerged as a
response to forces which were oriented toward preserving the former USSR’s
structures, with heavy reliance on the Soviet individual’s mentality, yet
partly in connection with the existent social-cultural situation, including its
manifest polyethnic nature.
In the present situation the old
order’s restoration is possible only through the use of force. Equally
unacceptable is the road which is proposed by radical nationalism and which,
again, implies the use of force. So,
the most acceptable is the way of civilized and conflict-free progress toward
the establishment of new realities, which are constructed in line with
everlasting human values and rights.
That is life, freedom, prosperity for every individual whatever his/her
nationality or confession may be. Here may be an area where various interests
converge on some common points and where joint efforts may be applied. It would
be good to part with the illusions that some outsiders may carry the burden of
these problems, be they the Russians or the West, or the global community at
large. The main burden of responsibility lies on the citizens themselves.
Being aware of this fundamental
thing may stimulate development of regional and national self-identity, focused
primarily on understanding one’s own interests and formed through the process
of searching for ways toward optimally achieving these. The role of culture is
great, too, as it poses as a form of self-organization and an instrument of
molding the people’s mentality, and in this capacity it serves as a basis for
motivating the people’s behavior and making vital decisions. Under the
conditions of a polycultural society the processes of deepened mutual
understanding among various cultural environments assume particular
significance, for, without relinquishing its own identity, each culture can be
enriched through these interactions and share its own attainments with others.
In today’s situation, Crimea is
faced with the necessity of making a strategic choice from among three options:
a) the restoration of mentality patterns of the past, and
conservation of its specificity and self-identity, probably on a more modern
level;
b) the population’s maximal and full involvement in modern
mass culture, which poses as a representative of modern mentality;
c) forming new structures of identity which would focus on
all-national interests.
These trends really exist in our life, interact with each
other and will continue manifesting themselves, but the choice is in
determining the mainstream dominant, on which, in the final analysis, will
determine if an integrated society will or won’t exist in Ukraine.
Oleksandr Piskun,
Center for Migration Studies, editor-in-chief, Problems of Migration magazine
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In May 1944 the Stalin regime
carried out a mass deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar people; about
200,000 people were deported to Uzbekistan, some areas in Kazakhstan,
Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Russia. In the summer of 1944 similar deportation
actions involved Crimean Bulgarians, Armenians, and Greeks, with the total
number of deportees estimated at roughly 38,000. Back in 1941 the ethnic German
population was deported from Ukraine (over 450,000 ethnic Germans and
non-German family members). Ethnic Ukrainians, particularly residents of West
Ukraine, were repeatedly deported, too.
All those deportation acts along ethnic identity lines were performed in keeping with decisions by state authority bodies at various levels, largely on the extra-judicial basis. The forms in which those deportation acts were carried out, were extremely cruel, resulting in massive loss of human lives, with those who survived having to eke, for many years, wretched and inhumane existence as outlaws and outcasts. However, over all those years the deportees were fighting for restitution of their rights, primarily the right to return to their ancestral homeland. In 1956, following the 20th congress of the CPSU, reprisals against the Balkars, Ingushes, Kalmyks, Karachaevs, Chechens were recognized as illegal, and the victims were allowed to come back home. The fight was forty-year long for the Crimean Tatars, though, who started coming in from the cold in the late ‘80s-early ‘90s.
As official data suggest, about 270,000 Crimean Tatars have returned to Ukraine (Crimea). According to the latest (1989) census, only 47,000 Crimean Tatars resided in Ukraine. The process of the ex-deportees’ return and social accommodation has been a complex one for a number of political-legal and social-economic reasons, and as demanding sizeable financing. While before 1993 the annual inflow of the returnees averaged 30,000, more recently the process has been sluggish at best, if not altogether suspended, for the said reasons. Ukraine is the only nation from among the former USSR’s successors, that has been trying to do its utmost to facilitate the Crimean Tatar people’s repatriation and integration. However, the Ukrainian State cannot cope with the formidable task single-handed in view of the deep economic crisis and lacking experience with regard to solving problems of such magnitude. The repatriation process cannot be promptly and successfully completed by Ukraine without aid from other nations and the entire global community. The result has been deplorable, so far, with the Crimean Tatar people remaining split in two halves, one of which stay where the Stalin regime had brought them to, that is in Central Asiatic nations and the Russian Federation. A study of the Crimean Tatar repatriation process suggests that delays in solving pressing problems are fraught with the menace of adverse trends which may well jeopardize the society. To ignore these might lead to tragic consequences not only for Ukraine alone. The problem of returning (integrating) the Crimean Tatar people to Ukraine reaches beyond Ukraine’s and even other former USSR successors’ immediate concern, rather it pertains to the entire global community as a major humanitarian challenge.
LEGAL PROBLEMS DEMANDING URGENT
REGULATION TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE EX-DEPORTEES’ RETURN AND INTEGRATION INTO
UKRAINIAN SOCIETY
The process of the ex-deportees’ return and integration comprises at least four major dimensions:
1. support for and facilitation of the ex-deportees’ return to their ancestral homeland;
2. facilitating the returnees’ bid for solving their social and economic problems;
3. evolving necessary legal environments for the returnees’ rehabilitation (restitution of their civil rights), both on the individual and ethnic entity levels;
4. defining the legal status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine.
As to the first of the above listed, the many-year-long fight by the Crimean Tatar people has brought about the opportunity for them to come in from the cold. However, the self-repatriation process has not been duly supported, so far.
When leaving their households in their deportation localities before heading for Ukraine, the ex-deportees get nothing to compensate for their expenses. Quite unseldom they have to abandon, being unable to sell, the dwellings that they had built with their own hands, taking along only those few belongings, which they can carry. Needless to say, there are no dwellings in Ukraine, waiting for them to move in, so they have to start from a scratch. In October 1992 Ukraine initiated an agreement which was signed by CIS Heads of State in the Kirghiz capital, Bishkek and which covered issues relating to the restitution of rights of the deported persons, ethnic minorities and peoples. As of today, the agreement has been ratified by Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Regrettably enough, the agreement, as is the case with many other CIS documents, has not been operative, and Ukraine, its Government’s well-nigh yearly resolutions on the returnees’ problems notwithstanding, has failed, so far, to make the process orderly.
As regards the second point, following the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Ukraine has virtually single-handed been carrying the burden of expenses relating to the returnees.
Government commissions have been set up to address problems of interdepartmental nature, manned/womanned by senior ministerial and departmental officials and headed by Ukraine’s Vice Premier in charge of humanitarian policies. In March 1996 the Government of Ukraine endorsed The Program of priority measures toward settling and accommodating the once deported Crimean Tatars and individuals belonging to other ethnic groups who have returned to Crimea and presently live there.
Since Ukraine proclaimed its independent statehood, the National Budget has specifically provided for outlays, necessary for the ex-deportees’ accommodation. According to official estimates, about 3 bn dollars must be allocated to this end. However, over 1992-1999 the State was able to allocate just 300 million dollars. And it should be noted that the (thus allocated means were basically spent on construction of dwellings, infrastructure development, construction of communication lines and public utilities. About half of the Crimean Tatars have no dwelling. Places of the Crimean Tatars’ compact residence in Bilogorsk, Simferopol, and in districts of Bakhchisarai, Dzhankoi, Simferopolsky, Leninsky, Kirovsky are characteristic of very low employment rates, which average 23 percent. Also lacking there is the social infrastructure, that is, roads, water-electric power- and heat-supply systems, sewerage, etc. For lacking funds culture, education restoration of historical-cultural relics of the Crimean Tatar people have been largely neglected. And the problem remains acute of taking into account and regulating the Crimean Tatars’ rights to participation in the process of land plot privatization and sharing.
The third point. Actually, the process of political rehabilitation of the deported persons along ethnic origin lines got under way on November 14, 1989 when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted The Declaration on recognizing as illegal and criminal the repressive acts against the peoples, subjected to forcible deportation, and on ensuring their rights. In accordance with the said declaration, the Russian Federation passed a separate law on rehabilitating the victims of political reprisals, which extends to those repressed on grounds of their ethnic identify.
There is no specific legislative act on the restitution of the Crimean Tatar people’s rights. Relevant provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Reprisals in Ukraine” (adopted on April 17, 1991, amended on May 15, 1992) 1 extend to individuals from among the deportees.
In keeping with Articles 1 and 4 of the Law, persons,
who were subjected to repressions, exiled or deported by the totalitarian
regime, as well as their family members, enjoy, among their other resituated
rights, the right to live in those populated places and localities in which
they had resided before the reprisals. However, regardless of provisions
contained in the Laws “On Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Reprisals in
Ukraine” and “On the Ukrainian Citizenship,” there long existed problems with
regard to the Crimean Tatars assuming Ukrainian citizenship and settling. Such
a state of affairs created certain tensions within the Ukrainian society and
gave grounds to state from international rostrums certain infringements on
human rights in Ukraine.
Relevant commentaries and recommendations on that
score were articulated by the UN Committee for economic, social and cultural
rights, and by High Commissioner for ethnic minorities Max Van Der Stoel.
Limitations incorporated in Clause 2 of Article 2 of
the Law “On the Ukrainian Citizenship” of 1991, were among the major causes of
the unsatisfactory situation with regard to assuming citizenship by the
ex-deportees, as specifying that Ukrainian citizenship may be granted only to
persons, “who work, on the State’s direction, are on active duty, take their
studies beyond Ukraine’s boundaries, or left Ukraine on legal grounds for some
other country to permanently reside there …”
______________________________________
1
See: The Law of the UkrSSR “on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions”/Bills,
resolutions and other acts adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the UkrSSR at its
3d session, February-July 1991; Part I, p.316; The Law Of Ukraine “On Making
Amendments to the Law of the UkrSSR “On Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Reprisals
in Ukraine”// Bills, resolutions and other acts adopted by the Verkhovna Rada
of the UkrSSR at its 5th session, January-July 1992; Part II, pp. 98-99
Naturally, such a definition could hardly be applicable to individuals who were deported from Ukraine in the extra judicial way. On April 16, 1997 the new redaction of the Law “On Citizenship” came into effect, with its provisions worded in such a way as to make the primary definition of Ukrainian citizenship extend to persons from among the deportees, to wit, “Persons, who were born or who permanently resided in Ukraine’s territory, as well as their descendants (children, grandchildren), if they lived, as of November 13, 1991, outside Ukraine, are not citizens of other countries, and who submitted, before December 31, 1999, following the procedures prescribed by this Law, applications for Ukrainian citizenship.” Those, who, for some reasons, fail to do so before the said deadline, shall be covered by Article 16 (assuming citizenship), without taking into consideration provisions of Clause 3, Part 2 of this Article (continuous residence, on legal grounds on the Ukrainian territory over the past five years). The adoption of the Law’s new redaction, considering the amendments, created better legal opportunities for solving the ex-deportees’ citizenship problems. And, at last, as a result of Ukrainian-Uzbek negotiations, in the summer of 1998 an agreement was reached on simplifying the procedure of relinquishment of Uzbek citizenship, with Uzbekistan still remaining home to the ex-deportees. 2
The issue of
juridically fixing the status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine remains
the most complicated and unregulated one, needing a political decision.
Back in 1991-1992 when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
of the 12th convention was drafting the bill “On Ethnic Minorities
in Ukraine” the issue arose of drafting a package of individual legislative
acts toward regulating the status of the Crimean Tatar people and the process
of their revival in Ukraine. Relevant instructions were issued and even draft
documents drawn out; however, for sundry reasons, these were never submitted to
the VR of Ukraine. So, it all could be boiled down to the Cabinet’s resolutions
on social and economic issues …
The Ministry for matters of nationalities and
migration submitted a draft law to the Cabinet “On rehabilitation and
safeguarding the rights of persons from among ethnic minorities that were
repressed and deported from Ukraine’s territory.” 3 Needless to say, the document does not
provide for regulating the Crimean Tatar people’s status. Versions of the draft
concept of Ukraine’s state policy with regard to autochthonous peoples and the
draft Law “On the status of the Crimean Tatar people,” which a group of experts
under the aegis of the Justice Ministry drew out, appear more promising and
encouraging. The new Constitution of Ukraine adds to a more optimistic outlook,
too, as for the first time it fixes the term “autochthonous peoples.” (Articles
11, 92, Clause 3, and 119). However, the solution to this legal problem has
been groundlessly delayed, too.
AN ANALYSIS OF CAUSES UNDERLYING DELAYS IN
SOLVING THE EX-DEPORTEES’ PROBLEMS
So, what are the main reasons that could explain the delays
in regulating the Crimean Tatar people’s status in Ukraine ?
While not venturing an exhaustive explanation, major
ones should be pinpointed, as we believe. Naturally, it would be expedient to
focus on those of objective nature:
¨
lacking
adequate experience in coping with such tremendous political-legal problems
¨
lacking
relevant managerial bodies
¨
shortages of
funds
Subjective reasons should be mentioned, too:
¨ lacking clear-cut, scientifically substantiated (approved and sealed) concept of Ukraine’s ethnic policies
¨ low awareness on the part of Ukraine’s (Crimea’s) authorities of the significance of solving the problem of the Crimean Tatar people’s revival
¨ low awareness of interactions between human rights and the need to democratically regulate legal relationships within a multiethnic society which is composed of the title nation, autochthonous peoples (the Crimean Tatars, Karaimes, Krymchaks, Gagauzes) and ethnic minority groups
¨ lacking political will, the authority’s fear of making unpopular, or incomprehensible in the public’s eye, decisions
¨ apprehensions with regard to the society’s likely destabilization
¨ appeasing anti-State political forces
______________________________________
2 See: The Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan on cooperation in solving citizenship problems of the deported persons and their descendants. Collection of Documents. – Kyiv, 1999, p. 206
3 Yu. Bilukha, Forming Ukraine’s Migration Legislation // Ukrainian Magazine on Human Rights, 1997, no. 1, p.g. 9
¨ conscious, deliberate (sometimes undisguised) actions by certain political forces, both inside Ukraine and beyond its boundaries, aimed at destabilizing the situation in Crimea and in Ukraine as a whole.
However superficial and sketchy the analysis may be of causes underlying the delayed action toward solving the Crimean Tatar people’s problems, it testifies, nevertheless, to the State’s lacking scientifically-substantiated and endorsed concept of the nation’s ethnic policies (and the migration component of these) as being the biggest, major cause.
So, the prime task is to see to it that such policies’ guidelines are developed and approved. And in tackling the task, it is of paramount importance to rely on international experience of solving such problems.
In keeping with what an expert analysis of international and national legal norms suggests, the grounds for recognizing the Crimean Tatar people as autochthones in Ukraine are as follows:
¨ the Crimean Tatar people historically evolved to form a distinct ethnic entity precisely on Ukraine’s territory
¨ the Crimean Tatar people has preserved its cultural, language, religious, ethnic identify, making it different from the Ukrainian nation (the title ethnic entity) and ethnic minorities, and is striving to preserve and further develop its ethnic identity
¨ the Crimean Tatar people has no ethnically affinitive state or homeland outside Ukraine
¨ it self-identifies itself as Ukraine’s autochthonous people.
The global community possesses certain experience in dealing with problems, which involve regulation of autochthonous peoples’ political-legal status. The journal “Migration Problems” recently launched a new column, “Autochthonous Peoples,” requesting Ukrainian and foreign scientists, researchers, public figures to contribute to formulating both concept-related guidelines and practical steps with a view of regulating the political-legal status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine.
While not
attempting at a speedy and comprehensive solution to the said problem, we hope
for facilitating the problem’s comprehensive study and its gradual and
consistent regulation. 1
The thesis, stating that the Crimean Tatar people is an autochthonous people, returning to its historical homeland, must be among the key provisions; also, it must be a subject of policies. A different thing, though, is in what form and when it may become a real political factor.
As studies attest, the young Ukrainian State’s priority steps should be toward drafting legal mechanisms to ensure the Crimean Tatar people’s representation to bodies of representative authority of both Crimea and Ukraine as a whole, toward legitimizing the status, fixing its functions involving the Crimean Tatar people’s representation, and toward legally fixing the Crimean Tatar people’s status in Ukraine.
In solving the Crimean Tatar people’s political-legal problems, bodies of state authority should rely on and take into consideration what Crimean Tatar representatives to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Crimean Supreme Soviet think on that score. Sure enough, in addition to these principal and top-priority problems there are a lot of other issues, which can be solved only if handled comprehensively. The Crimean Tatar people’s spokespersons should be involved in drafting a comprehensive program toward returning the deported people to their homeland and restituting their hitherto neglected rights, toward revival of their cultural-ethnic legacy.
______________________________________
2 See: Oleksandr Piskun. Editorial; Bill Bowring. The Rights of Autochthonous Peoples: International Experience Review; Valeriy Vozgin. The Crimean Tatars: Discrimination, Consequences of the Hushed Conflict/The Migration Problems. 1998, no. 2, pp. 21-43; Jeremy Webber. The Particular Situation of the Autochthones: Situation in Canada and Other Nations // The Migration Problems. 1998, no. 3, pp. 29-30; Nansen Award to Ukraine’s national; the speech by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees during a Nansen Medal awarding ceremony; the speech by Mustafa Dzhemilev at the award presentation ceremony; the address by the UN Secretary-General on the occasion of the Nansen Medal presentation: the address by Prime Minister of Ukraine Valeriy Pustovoitenko to UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ms. Sadako Ogata; Yuriy Bilukha. The speech at the 49th session of the Executive Committee for the UN High Commissioner Agency’s program // The Migration Problems. 1998, no. 4, pp. 37-44; Nadir Bakirov. The Crimean Tatar Problem and Legislative Support of Ethnic Minorities’ Rights in Ukraine // The Migration Problems. 1999, no. 1, pp. 28-33; Tetyana Klynchenko, Olena Malynovska, Ihor Mingazutdinov, Oleg Shmashur. The Turk-Meskhetins in Ukraine: De Jure Citizens, De Facto Refugees // The Migration Problems, 1999, no. 2, pp. 37-48; Olena Braichevska. Repatriates in Ukraine: Ways to Integration // The Migration Problems, 1999, no. 3, pp. 34-39; Olena Malynovska. Repatriation to Ukraine // The Migration Problems. 1999, no. 4, pp. 17-29
Now that the young Ukrainian state is in the process of being established, such approaches wil most certainly facilitate its independence and democratic order, will promote stability both in Ukraine and in Europe. Now the time for this is good also because the global community has developed an attentive and understanding stance on the Ukrainian society’s bid for a law-abiding and democratic state. So, there are good grounds to hope for not only moral support, but also a sizeable financial prop to this end.
Natalya Belitser,
Pylyp Orlyk Institute For Democracy
INTERETHNIC RELATIONS AND THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN CRIMEA
Ukraine is known to be home to some 130 nationalities
in addition to the title people. This fact cannot but cause certain problems
and tensions in interethnic relationships, particularly under the transition
period from totalitarianism to democracy and the conditions of a systemic
social-economic crisis, when fight is acerbated among various clans for control
over the national budget’s scarce resources and distribution levers toward
benefiting particular ethnic groups, clans, political groupings, and so on.
Parallel with this, in the modern world polycultural,
multiethnic political nations enjoy certain advantages, compared with
ethnically homogenous states, as being more dynamic in relations with other
countries, more open to the outer world and better adapted to accept new trends
through establishing most comprehensive and multifaceted contacts, thus making
their spiritual life richer and more diversified. A notion which is widespread
in everyday life is disproved about ethnic homogeneity allegedly facilitating a
state’s internal stability. To find enough proof of this notion’s fallacy it
might be worth while to look at the situation in Armenia, which, following the
well-known developments, turned to be the most ethnically homogenous nation
among the post-Union republics.
Interethnic problems exist in a number of Ukraine’s regions,
e.g. in Transcarpathia and Bukovina. However, if we leave apart the highly
controversial Rusin problem, the interethnic situation there has been evolving
within the framework of what is more or less typical of the Central European
Region, a certain system of relationships between the title ethnic entities and
ethnic or religious minorities, which became such not as a result of migration
processes, but just because of changes in state borderlines in the course of
empires collapsing and disintegrating, wars, and Europe’s peoples materializing
their right to self-determination.
In Crimea a far more complex situation has developed,
as interethnic problems per se, particularly after Ukraine attained its
independent statehood, have been aggravated by new factors, including those of
internal and external politics, which significantly brakes finding solutions to
problems that tend to mount. One of these factors is connected with a
decade-long history of Crimean separatism, which has been significantly influencing
not only interactions between Ukrainians and Russians, both making up Crimea’s
majority, but also relations between Ukraine and Russia on the international
level. A second, extremely important, factor is the problem of the Crimean
Tatars’ successful repatriation and integration following the genocidal
deportation act of 1944 and almost five decades in exile, which interrupted and
almost totally destroyed opportunities for this ethnic entity’s normal
development. The difficulties in solving the Crimean Tatar problems are
connected not only and, maybe, not so much with shortages of material resources
and lacking political will on the part of Ukraine’s and Crimea’s leaderships,
but also with lacking profound awareness of this problem on the part of the society.
Thus, the echelons of power, same as before, tend to
view the Crimean Tatar situation solely from the angle of the problem of the
once deported persons and their descendants, who were subjected to repressions
by virtue of their ethnic origin and who are coming in from the cold. All
attempts to solve this problem proceeding from the said premise appear to be
doomed to failure. On the other hand, spokespersons for other ethnic
minorities, who were deported from Crimea, such as Germans, Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks, unseldom try to reduce the problem of social accommodation and
integration to just quantitative estimates, and, hence, to needs of
repatriates, belonging to different ethnic groups, while insisting that there
should not be any differences in approaches to solving problems of the Crimean
Tatars and those of other ethnic entities which suffered from repressions.
Though much has been said at countless seminars, round-tables, conferences and
other public gatherings and fora about the Crimean Tatars’ very peculiar
situation, which is different from what can be seen with regard to other ethnic
groups of the once deported persons, there has been achieved neither clear nor
full awareness of the difference as such that objectively exists.
Proceeding from this, I will allow myself to briefly
reiterate one of the Crimean Tatar’s major demands, which consists in
recognizing them as not just one of Ukraine’s multitudinous ethnic minorities,
which basically resides in Crimea, but as an autochthonous people, with all the
ensuing consequences, including the right to so-called internal
self-determination, to establishment and legalization of special institutes and
mechanisms, allowing them to really influence their people’s destiny. Over the
past few years, particularly since the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine
in 1996, the public’s awareness has been growing of the Crimean Tatars being
not just an ethnic minority, or an ethnic group, but really an integral people.
Behold the rhetoric of public speeches at every level over several past years
in which precisely the formula “Crimean Tatar people” prevails. Sure, this
would not be enough because without a solid legal base, fixing all the rights
and duties of the Crimean Tatars as a people, harmonious interethnic relations
in Crimea cannot be attained. On the contrary, mounting disillusionment and
dissatisfaction with regard to the existent approaches to this problems and the
pace of its solution, may only lead to the Crimean Tatar movement’s
radicalization toward the full restitution of the Crimean Tatars’ rights in
their ancestral land, and that might be fraught with serious aggravation of
interethnic tensions in Crimea and the emergence of a serious ethnic-political
conflict in Ukraine. It should also be noted that, in this respect, the
endorsement by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the latest version of the
Crimean Autonomous Republican Constitution was a definite step backwards
because, though many of its precarious provisions which contradict Ukraine’s Constitution
and laws were deleted, the rights and interest of the Crimean autochthonous
people are in no way taken into account, which has had and will continue to
have its adverse effect on Crimea’s developments.
Yet, what is the gist of the Crimean Tatar problem’s
specificity ? Rather, it might be marked as the people now going through the
most critical period of its history, when the issue is at stake of whether it
will be able to materialize a chance for its resurrection as a historically
evolved specific ethnic-cultural commoness, that is precisely as a people, or
as a minority which possesses no adequate levers of political and economic
influence and which is doomed to gradual assimilation and extinction through
dissolving among the peninsular population’s majority. Such an outcome would be
the greatest tragedy not only for the Crimean Tatars themselves, not only for
Ukraine, but also for the entire human race. And it should be noted here that
the very probability of such a pessimistic forecast evokes a sharp response and
rejection from the people of such manifestly expressed ethnic-cultural
self-identification, whose existence has been placed in jeopardy. It might be
said that under such circumstances the collective instinct for self-survival is
sharply alerted, as attested by the developments in various regions of the
globe over past few decades, which is applicable not only to individuals, but
also to groups, united by common historical destiny, traditions, languages,
religions and other factors, which influence their identity. The widespread
phenomenon of large and particularly small peoples seeking to re-establish and
secure their own self-identity and its development warrants viewing it as a
determined trend, rather than a combination of chance coincidences, which,
probably, emerges as a response to the challenges of the rapid globalization
process, which may, among other things, result in excessive homogenization and
unification, and that harbors a really menacing potential for the entire human
race as a biological species. The menace lies not only in the loss of the
entire rich diversity of cultural heritage, but also in the gradual extinction
of genetically fixed differences, inherent in various races and ethnic groups,
that have evolved in certain geographical regions, under strikingly different
climatic conditions, since those times immemorial when factors of natural
selection were causing their effects.
Incidentally, it might be noted that, proceeding from
this operational hypothesis, tolerance in interethnic relations should be
extended not only to individuals who wish to integrate with the established
majority and accept their lifestyles and hence are willing to enter into
interethnic marriages, but also to those who oppose such mixed marriages, viewing
these, and not without certain grounds, as a means toward gradual assimilation,
which eventually leads to a people’s extinction as an individual
ethnic-cultural commonness. Such apprehensions are particularly typical of
small ethnic entities, who are minorities in their historical habitats, in view
of which fact similar sentiments on the part of some Crimean Tatars should in
no way be interpreted as a manifestation of interethnic intolerance. This is
worth thinking it over because sociological surveys to this effect are based,
as a general rule, on sundry variations of the so-called Bohgardus Scale, which
places readiness to accept interethnic marriages in the topmost position to
appraise the degree of tolerance. If we take into account the fact that works
by Bohgardus date back to 1924/1925, the time when “integration” implied
non-violent assimilation of aboriginal peoples and some other peculiar ethnic
groups as the most acceptable tool for adapting these peoples and groups to
conditions of “modern civilization” ( that is, the Western, Euro Atlantic
civilization model), we must admit that the thus obtained sociological survey
returns should be treated with a certain degree of caution and necessary
adjustments should be made, proceeding from the real situation, peculiar of a
definite ethnic group and that group’s chances for survival and further
development.
Kyiv’s Crimean Tatars community may provide a graphic
example of elderly and old people who feel permanent anguish and bitterness
because their descendents take no interest in their own ethnic-cultural roots
and actually have low, if any , awareness of them belonging to this ethnic
entity. On the level of individuals, such a course of events appears normal and
natural, and the individual’s right to choose his/her own road of development,
world outlook and place in the contemporary society raises no doubts
whatsoever, as a major component of liberal values. However, at the level of
the entire people as a historically evolved commonness, actions should be
viewed as just as natural which are aimed at its self-preservation as a
particular ethnic entity, including its desire to form compact settlements,
where ethnic environments prevail, let alone its strife for ethnic schools,
restoration of an integral educational system based on the mother tongue, etc.
Comparing the situation in which the Crimean Tatars
have found themselves with the conditions in which Crimea’s other ethnic
minorities live, which are not integral peoples, but just fractions of these, whose
full-blooded existence is secured by the existence of national State of their
own, such as Armenia, Germany, Greece, Bulgaria, Israel, Russia, and so on, we
inevitably arrive at a conclusion that the Crimean Tatars’ problems, which are
fraught with the danger of ethnic-political conflicts, cannot be solved solely
within the framework of programs for the ex-deportees’ social accommodation and
integration, nor can they be solved through Ukraine’s laws and legislative
acts, and international agreements, designed to protect ethnic minorities’
rights. As a rule, ethnic minorities, including those from among Crimea’s
deportees, on the whole are not given to frustration, fear and desperation,
which arise with the emerging awareness of the particular ethnic entity facing
the challenge to its very existence; besides they have far better developed
mechanisms, including those fixed by the International Law, and real
opportunities for maintaining and conserving their ethnic-cultural identities.
Proceeding from those premises, which might be
elaborated on and presented in greater detail, the gist of the Crimean Tatar
problem and its purport can be better comprehended as primarily the problems of
safeguarding that people’s further existence precisely as a people. It should
also be noted that the thus outlined problem cannot be solved, either, within
the framework of purely liberal notions and views of human rights, which are
based on absoluteness of the individual’s rights. A package of legislative acts
and decisions at the State’s level must proceed from a different approach, the
so-called “positive discrimination,” which might be more aptly put as an
“affirmative action,” the rather widespread and more correct term, which is
difficult to be rendered in Russian, but may be tantamount to “steps of
resolute support.”
As far as the so-called “Islamic factor” is concerned,
and what its role is in forming, molding interethnic relations in Crimea, it
should be noted that this factor has been creating additional predicaments for
the Crimean Tatars’ integration processes as being often used as an instrument
of anti-Crimean Tatar propaganda, particularly by the mass communication media
in Crimea, which has been stepped up of late, in view of the hostilities in
Kosovo and particularly in connection with the second Chechen war. It should be
admitted that neither Crimea nor Ukraine are exceptions in this respect,
because this factor has played a major role in the entire modern world,
including foreign and domestic political strategies pursued by various
countries, with them forming sundry alliances, both formal and informal, thus
influencing stability and developmental vectors of entire regions.
So, instead of speaking about the Islamic factor in
Crimea proper and largely because of the repatriation problem and the Crimean
Tatars' integration with their immediate environments with alien culture, alien
languages and alien religion, and into the Ukrainian society as a whole, it
appears more pertinent to view the problem in a broader way. Since no modern
nation exists in isolation, apart from external regional and global influence,
non-Moslems tend to perceive what is erroneously called the “Moslem world”
(meaning by that some consolidated, integral commonness), relations between
Moslem and Christian confessions and nations, as well as relations between
Moslem minorities and non-Moslem majorities within individual nations,
significantly influence the public opinion, political elites’ stands and
different authority bodies’ attitudes, as well as the societal atmosphere as a
whole. It might be briefly stated that in the modern world the “image of foe”
has been effectively built in the form of the grave Moslem menace looming on
the horizon to threaten the Christian-Judaic civilization.
Samuel Huntington’s renowned article “Clash of
Civilizations,” which the Foreign Affairs magazine published in summer of 1993,
played a major and highly controversial role in appraising the Islamic factor
in the “new world order” the end of Cold War ushered in. The said article
formulated an idea according to which the “civilizations,” practically
identical with religions, are doomed to global wars among them, with Islam, as
the old-standing enemy of the Christian, Western civilization playing the role
of the aggressor and formidable menace, along with the “Yellow threat” to the
Caucasian race, or in the form of the two threats’ combination. According to
Huntington, it is precisely such “civilization clashes,” which have replaced
the unmaterialized global catastrophe as a result of the two ideological
system’s confrontation, that will be the sources for impending global turmoils.
Among those scholars who challenge the Huntingenton
concept’s basic postulates and capital points Christian Scherrer, a researcher
with the Copenhagen Institute for Studies of World Problems, should be
mentioned. He took the trouble to thoroughly scrutinize all the conflicts which
Huntington’s article had relied upon to portray the dismal picture of Islamic
aggressiveness, which scrutiny resulted in a diametrically opposite conclusion.
As it turned out, in the bulk of the stated 33 conflicts the Moslems were on
the defensive, rather than on the offensive, and, as a matter of fact, they
were the victims, rather than the aggressors. There were only six of the stated
number of instances, which would allow to admit the role of the religious
factor which Hungtington had attributed to it.
To dispel persistent stereotypes of this kind,
regrettably, deep-rooted in popular consciousness, it might be pertinent to
address history of the past, for example, the Crusades. As is known, during
just one of those, the First Crusade in the late 11th Century lots
of virtually unarmed Moslems, Arabs and Turks, were killed by the armor-clad
Christian knights, and about half a million had to flee. At the same time, the
Moslem States’ interethnic tolerance may be attested by the fact that Turkey,
under the Ottoman Empire, accepted all Christians as its citizens, who were
members of some sects, banned and persecuted in their countries. In particular
Turkey gave shelter to the Russian Molokans, Baptists and followers of the Old
Orthodox Rite, who settled there.
Regrettably, many WWII episodes remain largely unknown
by the public, which are commensurate with the Danes’ effort to save Jewish
compatriots, such as the story of the Bosnian town of Tusla, whose Moslem
majority successfully defended the town’s Serbian and Jewish residents against
the threat of extermination.
If one takes a look at today’s major global
developments from the angle of that deep-rooted Christian-Moslem confrontation,
it could be worth-while to pay close attention to the history of a small
Christian people gaining independence in East Timor, the former Portuguese
colony, seized by Indonesia, which for several decades was struggling toward
realizing its right to political self-determination. It became possible only
after on October 20, 1999 Abdurrahman Vakhid, the Democratic Islamic Party
leader, who had received religious education in the Middle East and headed the
Islamic political movement since 1984, was elected President of Indonesia. It
should also be remembered that Indonesia is the biggest Moslem nation,
populated by 210 million people, of whom about 90 percent are Moslems. Unlike
the ex-dictator Sukharto, whose totalitarian regime had an iron grip on the
nation, the new Islamic leader adheres to democracy, non-violence and maximal
confessional tolerance. His words have been supported by his deeds; he has
positioned the leader of the secular opposition, the daughter of Sukarno,
Indonesia’s First President, as his deputy, Vice President; instead of punitive
raids on the separatists, he met with the leader of the East Timorese
Catholics, gave his consent to an independence referendum and agreed to recognize
its returns. And all this was accomplished under the leadership of the gravely
ill, almost blind, but profoundly authoritative Islamic leader, who has had to
overcome the stubborn resistance on the part of champions of “integral and
indivisible Indonesia,” including the military brass hats. Bloody skirmishes
and terrorist attacks against the proponents of independence were bridled
through the intervention of UN troops, invited to Indonesia. Could modern
history provide any example of some so-called Christian nation giving its
consent to granting independence to a little Moslem people who had been
conquered as a result of an imperial expansion? There is no such example, I am
afraid.
We might continue dwelling on the topic longer, citing
specific multitudinous examples of ethnic injustice and the threat of spreading
and/or fanning old and new anti-Moslem myths and stereotypes, deeply rooted in
the public’s consciousness. To find ways toward overcoming this widespread
phenomenon, based on some concrete example, it might be possible to attempt at
rethinking, or at least altering the customary view of the problem which
arouses concern on the part of the West’s liberal intellectuals. The issue in
question is the world public’s unanimous condemnation of the death verdict on
charges of blasphemy on the initiative of the Iranian ruler Ayatollah Homeini,
to Salman Rushdi, the author of the “Satanic Verses,” which was published in
the UK in 1988. And though the call for murdering a human being who made public
his views and convictions in an artistic form, really reflects the degree of
fundamentalism, not acceptable to any modern civilization, it would be proper
to think twice about the “progressive mankind” raising its voice to defend the
potential victim, while making Salman Rushdi sort of a hero and a symbol of
fight not against Islamic extremism, or terrorism, or bellicose fundamentalism,
but virtually against Islam per se, though formally it is recognized as one of
the great , equal, monotheistic religions. And few from among his defenders pay
attention to the real contents of the author’s works and to the underlying
philosophical concept.
With a view of getting better familiarized with
Rushdi’s system of world outlook, I will venture a quotation from Mr. Rushdi’s
more recent essay of 1990, which he wrote to defend his Satanic Verses and
which mirrors his stance of a person who views the outer world through a
migrant’s eyes. The essay was written, proceeding on the author’s experience of
having to abandon the roots, rupture customary bonds, of continuous changing
(slowly or rapidly, painfully or in a pleasing way), which all is so typical of
migrants and which, as I believe, are essentially metaphoric for the entire
human race… The Satanic Verses glorify hybridism, non-cleanliness, ubiquitous
mixing and those transformations which result from novel and unexpected
combinations of individuals, cultures, ideas, politics, films, songs. The book
glorifies unthoroughbredness, mongrelization and expresses fear of purity absoluteness…
A mix, mess, a piece of that and a bit of this-only in this way novelty can
emerge. And massive migration provides this golden opportunity. Born and bread
in Bombay, India’s most cosmopolitan city, Rushdi, as he confesses, has always
viewed himself as a mongrel, bastard of history, and London has added to this
feeling.
As the above excerpt may attest, the author’s aim was
not so much to ridicule Islam and its devotees, as to champion cosmopolitism as
a crede, and such an approach is fully entitled to existence. True enough, in
pursuing the task the author deemed it possible to speak profanely about those
religious principles which are holy to any Moslem. So, may we so surely
enthrone Salman Rushdi as a hero, while condemning his persecutors ? What would
the Western societies’ approach have been, if Cristianity had been the object
of such insults ? And though last year the new Iranian Government of liberal
President. Mohammed Hatami formally refused to support the death sentence and
called for refraining from this form of retaliation, the West still views
Hatami as obeying the clergy’s orders, just because the Iranian president has
repeatedly stated Rushdi’s guilt of blaspheming Islam... And it looks like
nobody outside the Moslem communities ever bothers to thinks about the real
moral responsibility of the person who has thus insulted the religious feelings
of hundreds of millions of believers.
As to the attractiveness of cosmopolitan ideas in
general, and particularly in the form they are worded in the above citation, it
might be noted that their popularity, at least in Europe, has not been on the
rise, rather it has been declining since the publication, same as hopes have
been dwindling away for using non-violent assimilation, integration of minorities
into ambient majorities as the main means of solving interethnic problems.
Contrary to this, belonging to a definite ethnic-cultural and/or
ethnic-religious community continues to be perceived as an essential component
of the individual’s self-identification, in no way contradicting various
individuals’ low or high self-awareness levels, such as individual awareness of
being a "European" or even a “cosmopolitan.” It looks as though the
course of most recent history tends to prove, rather than disprove, the idea
put forth by German historian Johann Gottfried von Herder and formulated like
this,” among man’s essential needs, such as food, shelter, rest and recreation,
communication, etc., there is also a need to belong to a definite group, which
is united by some common ties, particularly the language, collective memory,
permanent residence on the same land, and maybe also race, blood, religion,
feelings of common destiny, and so on.”
By way of conclusion, I would like to mention the
necessity of not only tactical decisions and actions, which can facilitate the
process of developing and establishing interethnic tolerance, but also of
designing strategic approaches to interethnic and interconfessional relations
in the upcoming millenium. As it appears in perspective in rearing the younger
generation in the spirit of sole “tolerance,” with regard to individuals and
groups of various ethnic origins, cultures, religions, may be not enough. As
tolerance merely means the individual’s consent to tolerate the presence of
some aliens as an undesirable phenomenon, which cannot be avoided. Instead, it
would be better to seek to evolve such a culture of interethnic relations,
which would view the presence of individuals, possessing different cultural
qualities in the broadest sense, as undisputed and indisputable bliss, a
precious gift, which makes every individual’s life richer, more meaningful and
interesting.
Annotation
The aged people still remember the cases, which became as incurable wounds in lives of many peoples of former Soviet Union was governed by Stalin.
The
hundred thousands of the Ukrainians, Poles, Byelorussians, Germans, Bulgarians,
Armenians, Greeks as “traitors” from ancestral lands were deported. 250 000
Crimean Tatars weren’t avoided by hostile eye of “father of all peoples”. On 18
May 1944, they as “traitors and the Nazi invaders collaborators” during years
of a fascist occupation, were deported from Crimea, mostly to Uzbekistan, where
they lived in special settlements with dream to return to historical homeland
up to 1956.
Currently
they come back to Motherland. What kinds of problems do they encounter? The
book “The return of Crimean Tatars. Chronicle of events” by Y. Tishenko and V.Pihovshik
gives the answer for the questions, which was just published by Ukrainian
Center of the political researches.
The book is
dedicated to modern history of the Crimean Tatar People, processes of a return
and resettlement in context of the social – political situation in Autonomous
Republic of Crimea. Some aspects of a formation of Crimean autonomy, main
phases of a development of the relations between Central Ukrainian government
and local bodies of government in Crimea are investigated. The central part of
book is dedicated to the development of Crimean Tatar Movement in that period.
The authors analyze the processes of repatriation and resettlement of Crimean
Tatars during 90s, issues and ways of the solution of them, which were arising
in that process.
The laws
and Government’s decrees on issues of a return and resettlement of former
deported Crimean Tatars, official information concerning a financing of the
process are published in the book.
We are
all the children of a single country. One land gave us a life and reared as
well. And as children of a single mother, we are obliged to help each other,
live in a peace, mutual assent and welfare. The book by Y.Tishenko and
V.Pihovshik can be named as interesting organic analysis of a modern life of the
smallish people, but which deserve a lucky destiny, with whom we will live
further. The destiny of Crimean Tatars – is a fate of all nationalities of
Ukraine, including Ukrainians.
Thus, the work of named authors will be interested not only for persons concerning themselves in modern history of Crimean Tatar People and social-political processes in Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and those aren’t indifferent to fate of a state as a whole, its peace, welfare and prosperity in forthcoming century.
Alena Trembitska
Journalist